A Study of Visual Communication: Cyclones, Cones, and Confusion by Eosco, Gina
  
 
A STUDY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION: 








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 





















© 2008 Gina Marie Eosco 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Visuals are at the forefront of providing information in today’s society.  They are on 
the front page of newspapers, the evening news, the Internet, and textbooks. They are 
particularly important in explaining risk and scientific processes such as the intricacies 
of climate change or the risks of cancer treatments. These visuals do not simply appear 
in the newspaper or on television without thought but often have distinct objectives or 
purposes given to them by their designer. The original objective of the graphic may 
not be achieved, however, if viewers misunderstand or misinterpret the graphic. 
Misinterpretations of risk visuals, such as hurricane track graphics, may have 
especially harmful consequences. Therefore, it is critically important to understand 
how scientific intent translates through visuals to evoke public understanding of 
science and risk assessment, a process that I call visual validity. To do attain scientific 
validity, the scientist’s objective for the graphic must be known as well as the public’s 
interpretation of the graphic. This thesis looks at the concept of visual validity from 
the scientist’s point of view using a graphic called the “cone of uncertainty,” a highly 
visible hurricane track graphic. Using a grounded theory approach, I conducted 19 in-
depth interviews with forecasters and meteorologists from a variety of government and 
private sector institutions including the National Weather Service, the National 
Hurricane Center, The Weather Channel, and Weatherbug.  I found that the cone of 
uncertainty has four main message objectives: (1) to communicate uncertainty, (2) to 
emphasize risks and impacts, (3) to show confidence in the forecast, and lastly, (4) to 
encourage individuals to listen to their emergency managers. The results suggest that a 
complicated relationship exists between the design of a visual and its many message 
objectives. Additionally, two potential characteristics of achieving visual validity 
emerged out of the data. First, the role of transactional communication between the 
 designer of a visual and its intended audience appears to play a role in accurate 
understanding and risk assessment. Second, supplementing a visual with an 
explanation also appears to play a role in attaining visual validity. These findings have 
implications for the visual literacy process, as well as the extent to which an individual 
understands complex science and risk visuals. Future research to seek out additional 
potential characteristics of the visual validity process will include the public’s 
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Visuals are at the forefront of providing information in today’s society.  They 
are on the front page of every newspaper, highlighted on the evening news, all around 
the Internet, and in every textbook used.    They are particularly important in 
explaining scientific processes and impacts such as the intricacies of climate change or 
the risks of cancer treatments.  These visuals do not simply appear in the newspaper or 
on TV without thought, but they often have a distinct objective or purpose given to 
them by their creator.  Although visuals may have the goal of conveying a particular 
message, the person reading or looking at that image also has the power to interpret it 
in their own way assigning their own purpose or meaning to it.  Despite the intended 
purpose, viewers have the power to maintain or change the objective.   
Both the creator and the reader of visuals play an important part in a visual 
message.  This is an especially important fact when using visuals to convey scientific 
or risk messages.  For example, there is growing concern within the hurricane 
community that decision makers, emergency managers, and the public are 
misinterpreting critical hazard messages leading to ill-informed decisions.  
Specifically, a visual representing hurricane risks and possible impacts, called the cone 
of uncertainty, appears to be at the forefront of this confusion (See Image 1 in 
Appendix B).  The cone of uncertainty is a common visual used by hurricane 
forecasters and broadcast meteorologists to communicate the track of a hurricane and 
its associated risk and uncertainty.  The graphic, as it looks today, first appeared in 
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2002 through the National Hurricane Center (NHC)1.  Since then, many other weather 
organizations created variations of the cone.  The active and destructive hurricane 
seasons of 2004 and 2005 tested the effectiveness of this graphic.  In fact, in August of 
2004, the cone of uncertainty came under much scrutiny during Hurricane Charley.  
Focusing on the thin black line indicating the center, people misinterpreted their 
relation to the storm and subsequently did not take appropriate action (Broad, 
Leiserowitz, Weinkle, & Steketee, 2007). 
After the misinterpretations occurred during the active hurricane season of 
2004, the United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) conducted a report in 
response to ill-prepared communities, specifically in response to Hurricane Charley.  
The report concludes that not only did the public focus too much on this particular 
graphic, but emergency managers did as well.  It states, “Some EMA's [Emergency 
management agencies] may have focused too much on the forecast track and not 
adequately considered the error cone or hurricane watches and warnings” (USACE, 
2004).  Despite the forecaster’s intent for people to understand the uncertainty of the 
track, people chose to focus on specific aspects of the graphic changing the original 
objective. 
Many hazards, both human and natural in origin, are difficult to communicate 
effectively through only the use of visual messages.  Many times, hazard 
communication involves explaining intricate processes as well as scientific 
uncertainty.  Forecasters grapple with how to take these complex models and 
formulate a message that is simple, yet successful for each audience.  The problem 
with hazard messages is that there are multiple audiences with many different needs.  
For example, emergency managers need detailed information about the forecast track 
                                                 
1 Graphic archives are not available on private sector weather websites.  The only historical analysis 
that is available is the National Hurricane Center’s graphical archive, which can be found at: 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastall.shtml. 
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to make critical evacuation decisions.  First- responders need to determine where to set 
up their supplies to ensure a fast arrival at the disaster scene.  Further, citizens in the 
impacted areas need to prepare their homes or evacuate to shelters.  Each of these 
audiences has a different level of scientific understanding as well as different potential 
impacts.  In all of these cases, graphics can enhance the message by visually capturing 
what it means.   
In fact, Trumbo (1999, 418) suggests, “Language, visual or verbal, is the key 
to making science communication possible.  Learning the visible languages of science 
and of visual representation is integral to the process of effective communication.”  To 
measure the success of “effective communication,” public interpretation of visuals 
needs further research.  As the cone of uncertainty shows, not all visuals are effective.   
To explore the effectiveness of visuals, three steps in the visual process 
warrant more research attention.  First, there is the role of the creator of the graphic, 
which in this example is the role of the forecaster2.  How do they prioritize and convey 
risk and scientific uncertainty in their visuals?  Do they have a specific objective or 
message that they want their audience to take away?  How do forecasters think about 
their audience?  Second, there is the viewer of the graphic, which as explained above 
includes many different types of audiences.  How do different audiences interpret the 
meaning of the visual?  What message do they take away?  How do graphics affect the 
public’s understanding of science and their subsequent risk perception?  Lastly, there 
is the visual itself, the cone of uncertainty.  What makes a graphic effective or 
ineffective in communicating scientific uncertainty and risk?  How do small changes 
                                                 
2 In this thesis, I will use forecasters and meteorologists to describe scientists.  All the interviewees in 
this sample are trained meteorologists, and at one time or another most have all been forecasters.  The 
difference between the two is small, but important.  A forecaster is someone who predicts the weather, 
whereas a meteorologist is a person who is employed in the field doing research, applications or 
providing weather services, just to name a few. 
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in the graphic alter public understanding of science and their subsequent risk 
perception?  
These three steps may lead to a better understanding of how scientific intent 
translates through visuals to evoke public understanding of science and risk 
assessment, a process that I like to call visual validity.  Researchers often consider the 
validity of their studies asking themselves if their methodologies accurately measured 
what they intended to measure.  For example, when writing a survey, researchers 
strategically word questions to ensure that the question is asking what they intend to 
ask.  Why not apply a similar process to visuals?  Scientists should also consider 
whether their visual is presenting what they intend to present.  Many visual variables 
complicate this process, though, allowing the individual reading the graphic to take 
away many meanings.  The original objective of the graphic may not be achieved 
because viewers may misunderstand or misinterpret the graphic.  Researching how 
scientific intent translates through visuals to evoke public understanding and accurate 
risk assessments will allow scientists and graphic designers to identify the variables 
that may interfere with accurate interpretations.   
 
Thesis overview 
This thesis will take the first step to look at visual validity by focusing on the 
scientific intent of visuals concentrating on how scientists prioritize and convey 
information to create a visual and its associated message.  Through interviews with 
hurricane forecasters, it will focus on hurricane forecasters’ perspectives on hurricane 
track graphics, specifically on the cone of uncertainty.  Drawing on literature from a 
variety of disciplines, this thesis will map out the life of a visual from its creation to its 
dissemination and suggest potential variables that may cause low visual validity, that 
is, misinterpretations of the graphic.  
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Chapter 2 provides the necessary background to understand how the 
meteorological community functions as well as provides the related science, risk, and 
visual theory to support these ideas.  Chapter 3 discusses the data collection methods 
and approach used in this research.  Chapters 4 through 7 present results, as well as 
related discussion for individual sections.  Chapter 4 focuses on identifying actors 
involved in designing visuals as well as the audience that receives them.  Chapter 5 
discusses the value of explanation for high visual validity in risk visuals.  Chapter 6 
outlines the many message objectives (both scientific and behavioral) that emerged 
from the results and discusses the potential relationships between these objectives and 
the graphic.  Chapter 7 defines visual framing as it relates to specific examples given 
by the forecasters and discusses the implications of visual framing for visual validity.  
Finally, Chapter 8 provides commentary on these findings and discusses the 




THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Overview  
To track the life of a visual, it is important to provide the context in which the 
visual derives not just from the point of view of the case study, but also why visuals 
play an important role in communication altogether.  To do this, this chapter: 
• Outlines the role of visuals in science education and in science learning; 
• Argues that meteorologists play an analogous role to science educators, except 
as it applies to their type of communication 
• Provides a discussion of visual literacy and its potential effects on the success 
of a visual message, specifically where it pertains to risk. 
• Begins to discuss the life of a visual. 
Throughout this chapter, questions are posed that will be explored and 
discussed in the following chapters.  There is a summary of research questions at the 
end of this chapter.  Additionally, throughout the literature review and results chapters, 
I refer to many visuals.  These visuals are located in Appendix B. 
 
Science Visualizations: How Did Visuals Become the Face of Science 
Have you ever seen a science book without graphics?  Or, a newspaper without 
pictures? Graphics, visuals, and pictures all help to tell a story, create a message, or 
present information.  Educators have long known that visuals enhance the learning 
process.  Studies show that visuals with text compared to text alone have an impact on 
levels of understanding, and further that some people prefer to think spatially rather 
 7
than to think from verbal cues augmenting the idea that visuals may enhance learning 
(Rieber, 1994; Halpern, 1996). 
Furthermore, students and professionals in scientific disciplines “are 
characteristically visual-spatial thinkers and communicators” (Mathewson, 1999, 37).  
It is not surprising, then, that a new field of scientific visualizations emerged out of 
science disciplines.  According to Gordin and Pea (1995), scientific visualization: 
stands for diverse scientific and social enterprises that include a new type of graphic 
representation; the creation of dramatic scientific images and their animation; an 
emerging academic field that combines elements of science, computing, semiotics, and 
1.) Usually incorporate massive 
amounts of data 
2.) Aim for verisimilitude with the 
phenomena they represent 
3.) Aim to represent entire 
phenomena represented holistically 
by interpolating from data 
4.) Use color extensively to encode 
the magnitude of variables 
5.) Animate sequences to show the 
progression over time 
6.) Rely on high-speed computation 
(e.g. supercomputers) 
7.) Usually represent spatial 
phenomena 
Figure 1.  Characteristics of Science Visualizations 
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the visual arts, and the coordination of a suite of advanced technologies to collect, 
store, process, and image large data sets (249).   
This emerging field allows scientists to take complex information and transform what 
is an abstract or intangible concept into a concrete, tangible visual.  There are seven 
defining characteristics for scientific visualizations as outlined in Figure 1 (Gordin & 
Pea, 1995, 252).  
For example, in relation to vast amounts of data, Image 2 shows a scientific 
visualization of a potential storm surge for Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 
(Van Heerden, 2005).  Storm surge models, sometimes known as SLOSH (Sea, Lake, 
Overland Surges from Hurricanes) models, help to visualize the potential flooding 
from a rise in ocean level waters.  Although this visual is not as popular as the cone of 
uncertainty graphic, TV meteorologists may use this visual to convey the storm surge 
risks to the public.  To make this graphic, forecasters consider both historical as well 
as predicted levels of surge for each individual storm.  Additionally, the models may 
include estimates of the storm surge based on its pressure, size, forward speed, track, 
as well as the wind intensity (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA, 2006).  
This one image shows the complexity of creating scientific visualizations 
under the defining characteristics (See Figure 1).  The model may include a substantial 
amount of data, especially if it incorporates all of the estimates for pressure, size, 
forward speed, track, and wind intensity.  Secondly, the purpose of the model is to 
predict the storm surge using the most accurate, up-to-date information for that storm 
for that particular area.  This combines the scientific visualization goals of showing 
truth while also interpolating the data for future prediction.  In addition, the image 
uses extensive color to differentiate among the potential storm surge heights.  The 
power of scientific visualizations lies in their ability to convey a message while 
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incorporating multiple data points.  One can imagine how many graphics forecasters 
would have to create if scientific visualizations did not exist. 
Storm surge visuals only tell part of the hurricane impact story, however.  
There are complex, technical models to explain wind intensity, track uncertainty, 
potential inland flooding, and potential areas for tornado watches and warnings.  All of 
these dimensions could potentially use their own scientific visualizations, and indeed, 
many already have their own visualizations through public, private and academic 
institutions (See NOAA, 2006; Van Heerden, 2005).  Image 2 and other scientific 
visuals provide a unique and powerful tool to communicate with other disciplines or to 
non-scientific audiences.  It is easy to see why forecasters and other scientists use 
visuals to assist in communicating their message. 
 
Learning with Visuals 
In addition to scientific visualization’s powerful communication function, 
scientific visuals also provide a unique tool for educating the public about hazards.  In 
fact, the use of scientific visualizations is common in training young scientists about 
complex scientific models.  As Gordin and Pea suggest, “SciV [scientific 
visualizations] can provide a more accessible inscriptional system for students to 
understand the subject matter, processes, and results of science.  Through the use of 
color and animation, SciVs aim at achieving verisimilitude with the phenomena they 
represent” (1995, 261).  The inclusion of scientific visualizations into curriculums is 
part of a larger curriculum design called inquiry based learning.  Inquiry based 
learning stems from the idea that the propagation of science is through questioning 
using current knowledge to explore or gain future knowledge (National Research 
Council, 2000).  Inquiry based learning through scientific visualizations generates 
inquiry through questioning visuals, but also through creating visuals.  The 
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combination of inquiries helps to develop science content understanding in four main 
ways as expressed by Edelson, Gordin, & Pea (1999, 394).  
• Allowing the student to question their knowledge leads them to 
“confront the boundaries of their knowledge or recognize gaps in that 
knowledge,”  
• “Successfully completing a scientific investigation requires science 
content knowledge,”  
• “Inquiry activities can enable learners to uncover new scientific 
principles and refine their preexisting understanding of scientific 
principles in the answers that they construct,”  
• “Inquiry activities can give learners the opportunity to apply their 
scientific understanding in the pursuit of research questions.”   
The classroom is not the only environment in which inquiry based learning 
occurs or the only environment in which science content understanding is essential.  
Emergency managers and the public confront scientific visualizations on a daily basis.  
Acknowledging the fact that scientific visualizations are on different technical levels, 
the inquiry process is still quite analogous between students of science and those 
interpreting science such as emergency managers or the public. 
For example, during a hurricane event3, the public must confront the 
boundaries of their hurricane knowledge and seek additional information to make 
informed decisions.  Looking at Image 1, New Orleans is in the far west section of the 
                                                 
3 According to the American Meteorological Society Glossary of Weather and Climate, the definition of 
a hurricane is “a severe tropical cyclone with maximum 1-minute sustained surface wind speed greater 
than 64 knots” (Geer, 1996, 114).  The definition does not cover the multiple impacts that a hurricane 
can have on local communities.  Hurricane Katrina proves how one event brings a variety of impacts on 
different communities.  In terms of weather impacts, Louisiana mainly had a flood event, whereas 
Mississippi experienced category 4 strength winds.  Thus, a ‘hurricane event’ includes both the idea that 
a hurricane according to scientific definitions exists, but also includes the possible social and scientific 
impacts of the said hurricane.  
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cone of uncertainty, which means that the center track may travel through this 
location.  The public must follow hurricane forecasts and visuals such as this one.  
What is this visual telling them and should they be concerned?  Those are the 
questions of concern to the public.  Similar to the inquiry process, the public assesses 
the information they know and the information they need to know.  They create 
questions, and investigate the current science in pursuit of many answers.  Should they 
listen to evacuation orders or take shelter at an emergency operation center?  They 
may gather information from an online weather site, or compare forecasts from their 
local TV meteorologists.  Through their process of inquiry, they gain scientific 
knowledge regarding hurricanes and the potential impacts on their city or region. 
The main difference between students experiencing inquiry based learning and 
a TV audience experiencing it is that the students have a teacher or a professor present 
to answer their questions.  Further, they have someone present to ensure that they 
understand the material.  The analogous figure for the public is a forecaster.  What role 
do forecaster’s play in the public’s learning process?  Do they also ensure that the 
public understands the science or the risks present during a hurricane?   
 
Transmission View: No One to Clear the Confusion 
Hurricane information comes in a variety of flavors from TV to the newspaper 
from the NHC to ABC to NBC to CNN to the Weather Channel.  Just like students, 
emergency managers and the public must sift through the “scientific literature”, and 
interpret what the graphics and forecasts mean to them.  As Gregory and Miller (1998, 
104) suggest, “Media audiences have to do work: they have to understand the visual 
and verbal languages of media communications and absorb their content, if they 
choose, into their own set of personal and cultural experiences.”  What happens when 
an emergency manager or a member of the public does not understand the science?  
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What happens when they are unsure of how to interpret the message or the possible 
impacts from a hurricane?   
With the student example, the classroom always has a teacher to respond to the 
inquiry.  TV meteorologists and hurricane specialists are the analogous figure to 
teachers.  Although many forecasters may see themselves as simply givers of weather 
information, the case can easily be made that TV forecasters are educators of natural 
hazard information.  During a hurricane event, TV meteorologists, hurricane 
specialists, and many other forecasters are communicating and explaining where the 
hurricane is most likely to hit, and its potential impacts on that area.  Often times, the 
information is complex and uncertain, which makes it difficult to present.  Showing 
graphics allows the viewing audience to visualize the location of the hurricane as well 
as allows the forecaster to present visuals for the areas and types of potential impacts.     
It is at this point, though, that the analogy breaks down.  Students and teachers 
interact constantly through out a classroom setting.  When there is confusion regarding 
a topic or visual, a student asks the teacher for clarification.  Where does clarification 
enter into the forecaster to public or emergency manager relationship?  Like much of 
science communication, the forecaster to public relationship may follow a 
transmission view of communication where the forecaster sends a message, and the 
public simply receives it (Dornan, 1999; Lewenstein, 1995).  Forecasters may not be 
readily available to answer the public’s questions, in large part due to the size of the 
public.  Thus, the public must make their own assessment, right or wrong, regarding 
the uncertainty of the hurricane track and their potential risks.  This may explain one 
of the potential reasons why the public and emergency managers are misinterpreting 
the cone of uncertainty; there is no one present to clarify their confusion.  
Another potential reason that misinterpretations occur is that the public may 
not be capable of understanding the visuals.  According to the 2008 National Science 
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Foundation’s Science and Engineering Indicator studies, citizens in the United States 
still do not have high awareness about the scientific process, nor do they have the 
ability to answer simple scientific questions.  The report notes that the ability to 
answer the scientific questions is positively related to formal science education 
(National Science Board, 2008).  Additionally, the deficit model, although widely 
criticized, suggests that the public lacks the scientific knowledge required to function 
in a scientific society (Miller, 1998).  Scientists must fill the public’s knowledge gap.  
Knowing this and combining it with the public’s poor performance on the indicators 
study, journalists simplify their science communication techniques.  Although some 
meteorologists are in the journalist setting, little is known about how they simplify 
their communication techniques.  Further, the simplification process referred to above 
is concerning science writing or science reporting.  It, however, does not include 
visuals.  If the public has a deficit of knowledge, as the Science and Engineering 
Indicator Study suggests, then forecasters should potentially simplify their graphics as 
well to reduce any public confusion.   
 
Visual Literacy: Scientists’ versus the Public(s)’ 
As stated earlier, graphics and visuals provide a unique tool for scientists to 
communicate about complex issues, such as hazards, with larger audiences.  To 
scientists, these objects represent a common and formal language describing intricate, 
scientific processes while at the same time allowing further interpretation from lay 
publics (Lammers & Barbour, 2006).  Graphics, then, act as a boundary object.  
Boundary objects are objects that sit between more than one social world such as that 
of the forecaster and the public.  Boundary objects may “have different meanings in 
different social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than one world 
to make them recognizable, a means of translation” (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p.393).  
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For Image 1, meteorologists may see the graphic as expressing the 67th percentile of 
the mean average track error over the last 5 years, whereas the public may see it as a 
representation of their risk.  Neither group is necessarily wrong, but it shows how 
different audiences use the object for distinctively different purposes.  The 
implications of different audience interpretations may make the difference between 
evacuating or not, which subsequently may lead to saving lives or not.  This not only 
indicates the power of visuals, but also the influence of individual perceptions.  
The problem is science communicators tend to group “the public” into one 
main audience treating this public as one entity (LaFollette, 1992).  This allows 
scientists to assess one group, the public, and express their scientific goals and 
objectives through only the communicator’s point of view, the scientist.  There is 
relatively little attention given to the audience’s goals and objectives for the same 
topic.  For example, the needs of emergency managers, homeowners, or first 
responders are all very different.  Although it is impossible to cater to everyone’s 
needs, researchers suggest evaluating the different types of your audience before 
creating a message.  Most messages are not one size fits all.  That is, one message will 
not satisfy every division of an audience.  Using a visual as the message then, one 
visual will not satisfy every division of an audience either. 
In fact, the literature on visual literacy suggests that people bring multiple 
interpretations to graphics.  Defined by Wileman, visual literacy is “the ability to 
‘read,’ interpret, and understand information presented in pictorial or graphic images” 
(Wileman, 1993, 114).  Further, Sinatra offers that visual literacy is the “active 
reconstruction of past visual experience with incoming visual messages to obtain 
meaning” (Sinatra, 1986, 5).  Many people have some prior experience with hurricane 
graphics whether it is a satellite image seen online, in a newspaper, or viewed on TV.  
When a new hurricane is approaching, prior knowledge of past visuals combines with 
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the new information presented.  Each hurricane event is like a fingerprint.  Every 
hurricane is unique with its own sensitivities, i.e., track behavior and uncertainty, wind 
speed, size, etc., which requires the processing of new information. 
Indeed, all hurricanes are unique, but the graphics to some extent stay the 
same.  For example, the cone always represents the 67% percentile of the 5-year mean 
average track error.  Since the graphic stays relatively the same, the public should 
have the ability to understand it.  As the visual literature shows, though, some images 
require an individual to have higher analytical abilities, or perhaps spatial abilities in 
the case of a map.  Research shows that there are two modes of map processing, 
holistic, a gestalt approach of taking in the visual as a whole, versus analytical, an 
approach that takes in individual features (Hunt, 1974).  Kirby suggests that within 
these two processes there are levels of abilities that people may possess, which 
changes how they process different types of maps (Kirby, 1994).  This has 
implications on people’s varying abilities, then, to ‘read’ or become visually literate 
with various maps.  This could potentially explain why there are varying 
interpretations of the cone of uncertainty.  The public possesses varying abilities to 
interpret the graphic.   
Although there are varying abilities, everyone is visually literate who has the 
ability to see.  The difference in literacy stems from the meaning that one takes away 
from the visual.  As stated earlier, forecasters may have a distinct purpose, or 
meaning, that they are trying to convey when designing their graphic.  In this sense, 
the creator of the visual expresses their meaning.  However, independent from the 
forecaster’s intent, the audience viewing the visual may create their own distinct 
meaning despite the intended purpose.  Creating meaning from the visual requires 
many intricate cognitive processes that go beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, it 
is important to understand that these processes are a factor in how people create 
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meaning, and an indication of why there are many different interpretations to the same 
visual.  Knowing this though, forecasters may influence an individual’s meaning of 
the graphic by associating a verbal or written message.   
As Duchastel (1978) outlines, there are three purposes for graphics associated 
with verbal or written messages, the most applicable of which is the explicative role to 
explain features that are too intricate to describe verbally.  Reversing this idea then, 
readers of visuals may need to see and hear both the graphic and the written or verbal 
message, as graphics associated with a complicated verbal or written message may 
lose their meaning without that description.  Further, Braden suggests that “as the 
number of words needed to describe the object increases, so does the need to illustrate 
it” (1994, 200).  Again, reversing this concept, if one is showing a visual representing 
complex science, for example, then it is possible that the reader must hear the written 
or verbal message while seeing the image.  From this literature, two questions emerge.  
First, can the cone of uncertainty stand alone, or does it need supporting written or 
verbal messages?  Second, if forecasters suggest that the visual does need a verbal or 
written explanation, what does this message entail?  What are the message objectives?  
All of this is key to an individual’s visual literacy success with the cone of uncertainty, 
which subsequently affects their public understanding of science and their risk 
assessment. 
 In addition to taking away different meanings, the public and emergency 
managers have different motivations when looking at a hurricane visual.  First, 
members of the public and emergency managers have different responsibility levels.  
Members of the public have a responsibility to themselves, their family, and their 
property.  For emergency managers, they have a responsibility to protect people and 
property in a much larger geographic area.  The difference in motivation and 
responsibility may change their approach to visual literacy.   
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 Furthermore, the difference in motivation may also alter the meaning they take 
away from a visual, and consequently their behavioral responses.  Protection 
motivation theory (PMT) suggests that a hazard must pose a harmful threat as well as 
a high probability of occurrence to prompt motivation to protect oneself (Rogers, 
1975).  Building off PMT, Neuwirth, Dunwoody, and Griffin (2000) suggest that the 
initial threat appraisal of the hazard may affect the next steps of information seeking, 
and the type of information sought.  Differing levels of responsibility as well as their 
motivation to look at a visual may influence their initial threat appraisal and may or 
may not prompt them to seek more information.  For example, when emergency 
managers perceive a hurricane threat, understanding visuals becomes critical.  
However, only having one visual does not provide enough information for them to 
make accurate decisions.  In response to this need, software developers designed a 
sophisticated program to express the physical threats and uncertainties involved with a 
hurricane (see Hurrevac, 2006).  For emergency managers, their visual meaning of the 
cone of uncertainty may prompt them to seek out more information; whereas 
meanings from the public may vary from making decisions based on the cone to 
seeking additional information.   
Information seeking, in addition to gathering more information about a storm, 
may also include finding ways to alleviate the risk.  In fact, behavioral responses to 
risk messages are stronger when the message includes both the communicated risk as 
well as the components to efficacy (Witte, 1992).  The cone of uncertainty, in its 
current form, does not present potential behavioral responses, just the risk.  Although 
there are many positive behavioral actions an individual may take after seeing the cone 
of uncertainty, there are also many decisions that cause harm or injury.  If the visual 
has a corresponding verbal or written message, does that message include 
communicating positive behavioral actions?  Do forecasters think about including the 
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components of efficacy in their messages to the public?  Further, what are the 
appropriate actionable items from looking at the cone of uncertainty? 
To complicate the scientist to public relationship further, research shows that 
there are differences in expert versus lay judgments regarding risks.  Some researchers 
suggest that scientists think about risk quantitatively whereas laypeople think about 
risks more qualitatively.  Scientists tend to associate risk with probability, whereas the 
public tends to think more about past experiences, or past impacts (Tverskey & 
Kahneman, 1974; Slovic, 1999).  It is clear from the design of Image 1 that forecasters 
do indeed think more quantitatively.  Recall that the white cone represents the 67th 
percentile of the mean average track error over the last five years.  How does this 
quantitative depiction appeal to the public?  Furthermore, when designing visuals, do 
forecasters account for the fact that the public may think more heuristically, and less 
quantitatively? 
Moreover, when communicating scientific uncertainty, it is particularly 
important to evaluate the audience’s comfort level with uncertainty.  Science 
communicators should not necessarily limit uncertainty information assuming that the 
public will not understand.  Researchers suggest that science communicators should 
negotiate with the public to determine what level of scientific uncertainty is helpful in 
a decision-making process (Wynn, 1992).  To what extent do forecasters actually 
negotiate this level with the public?   
The varying views, interpretations and motivations of the audience all 
influence the effectiveness of a graphic.  People’s prior knowledge affects how they 
‘read’ the visual.  Cognitive processes transform the individual’s creation of visual 
meaning.  Lastly, differing motivations and responsibilities may alter the message they 
take away as well as subsequent behavior.  Although the creator of graphics may 
intend a specific meaning, it is clear that the audience plays a powerful role in 
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interpreting graphics.  How do forecasters choose to convey information in light of 
this information?  How do they treat multiple audiences, and their subsequent variety 
of interpretations?  
 
The Life of a Visual 
 By focusing only on the scientists’ role in creating and thinking about visuals, 
it is not surprising that visual communication can cause a copiousness of confusion.  
Although the literature suggests that learning with visuals is more effective, the 
literature also poses a number of ways that scientists may negatively alter the visual 
process.  From a top down design, to not conducting an audience analysis, to not 
negotiating the level of uncertainty, there are many places where scientists could 
potentially miss a step.  What the literature does not tell us is how scientists think 
about visuals.  Although the science and technology studies literature shows what 
visuals represent, i.e., the scientific process (Lynch, 2006), or how science graphics 
become visible through complex instruments (Lynch, 1985), or further, how visuals, 
specifically graphs, mark the distinctiveness of science (Latour, 1986), the literature 
tells us very little about how scientists think about communicating visuals with the 
public.  The greater objective of this research is to explore how scientists think about 
visuals in addition to how they convey and prioritize risk and uncertainty information.  
What role do visuals play from a scientist perspective?  How do they see the many 
divisions of the public using such a visual?   
This research is beginning to track the life of a visual from its conception to its 
interpretation.  Tracking this life will allow a deeper understanding of the steps 
involved in creating visual validity.  Scientists, in this case, forecasters, can help 
uncover the first piece: how it is that a visual is born.  To do this, I developed the 
following research questions that are grouped into the following four categories.  
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• Section 1 - Types of communication and audience analysis 
o What types of communication (transmission or transaction) do forecasters 
use when communicating with visuals?  
o Who do forecasters identify as their multiple audiences or stakeholders? 
o How do forecasters characterize their audience’s scientific abilities? 
o Do forecasters think about visuals from a deficit model of science 
communication? 
• Section 2 –  An analysis of visual validity 
o Can the cone of uncertainty stand alone, or does this visual require verbal 
or written explanation? 
o What are the implications of this for risk visuals as a whole? 
• Section 3 – Exploring relationships between a visual and its message objectives 
o What are the communication objectives of the cone of uncertainty?  
o What are the appropriate behavioral responses to the cone of uncertainty? 
• Section 4 – Visual framing 
o How do the message and behavioral objectives relate to the actual design 
of the visual? 
 This study will examine all of these questions as the first step of a visual’s life.  
Using the cone of uncertainty as a case study offers a closer look into the life of one 
visual with the additional hope that it will help identify key factors that might apply to 
other graphics, as well.  This study is one phase of a larger area of research that will 
require many more years of research.  Future research is discussed in the discussion 
sections in chapters 4-7, as well as in the conclusion, Chapter 8.  The next chapter 






Overview of Research Approach 
 Current research in visual communication is primarily atheoretical, which does 
not provide a substantial foundation from which to pose hypotheses.  The purpose of 
this thesis, then, is to pose testable questions established from a body of qualitative 
data.  The methods used in this study are therefore based on a grounded theory 
approach.   Grounded theory provides a technique to conceptualize categories, explain 
and understand the data as well as identify patterns (Charmez, 2001, 335).  Grounded 
theory first emerged from Glaser and Strauss (1967) who emphasized the importance 
of exploratory research, which is summarized as looking at subjects or ideas that we 
know a limited amount about, and knowing this, allowing the qualitative data to lead 
the researcher to pose new theories.  The qualitative focus of this study is critical to 
identifying those patterns and further developing theory in the area of science and risk 
visuals.   
 I chose one visual, the cone of uncertainty, to begin to understand the creation 
of a visual from a scientist’s perspective.  As Patton (2002, 13) so poignantly states, 
“If you want to know what something means to them [in this case scientists], how it 
affects them, how they think about it, and what they do about it, you need to ask them 
questions, find out their experiences, and hear their stories.”  As one of the goals of 
this study is to gain insight into how scientists think about visuals, I chose to ask 
forecasters what the cone of uncertainty means to them, how it has worked for them, 
and how they think about how their audience interprets it.   I designed this study to 
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answer these types of questions within the limits of the case study on the cone of 
uncertainty.  
To answer these questions, I conducted in-depth interviews with 
meteorologists who have experience creating or communicating about the cone of 
uncertainty.  According to Weiss, qualitative interviews are defined as, “interviews 
that sacrifice uniformity of questioning to achieve fuller development of information” 
(1994, 3).  As Patton suggests above, it also allows you to hear the participants’ 
experiences and stories.  The intent of this study is to gain a fuller understanding of 
how visuals function from a scientist’s perspective, which means gaining insight into 
how meteorologists think about the cone of uncertainty, a controversial graphic.  
Conducting interviews is a useful approach for this objective as it allows me to hear 
the stories of how the graphic originated, and provides me with a fuller understanding 
of the meaning of this graphic.  Visuals may seem like artistic additions to scientific 
research projects, but as the interviews showed me, they represent much more than a 
picture. 
 
Data Collection Overview 
Question development and interview setup. 
 The best characterization of the interview protocol is synchronic, as it did not 
use time to structure the order of the questions.  In this case, the best way to achieve 
coherence, that is to ensure that the data collected flows naturally or fits together, was 
to organize the questions in a categorical manner.  The original protocol focused on 
three main areas, the history of the cone, the science of the cone, and the objective of 
the cone.  The Cornell University Committee on Human Subjects reviewed the 
interview design and questions, and determined that the study was exempt from any 
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further review (See Appendix A for the complete set of questions as well as the USHC 
approved consent form.) 
 After I conducted a few interviews, I realized that the protocol was falling 
short of providing the necessary data.  As Weiss states, “the risk in synchronic reports 
is that they will lack a strong conceptual framework, and so will appear to be merely a 
collection of observations” (1993, 45).  The advantage of using a grounded theory 
approach is I could alter the protocol to ensure that the interviews are capturing the 
necessary data. 
 The second protocol included similar questions regarding the cone of 
uncertainty, but I categorized them in the following four areas: audience analysis, 
message objectives, behavioral response, and design techniques.  Providing categories 
for the questions gave better structure for the interviews, and also helped with the data 
analysis discussed later in this chapter.  With this revised protocol, the interviews 
followed a semi structured, tree and branch approach, as outlined by Rubin and Rubin 
(1994, 159).  The order of the questions did not add to the methodological rigor.  As 
long as I covered all the categories in the interview, and the interviewees felt 
comfortable providing information, then I considered the interviews successful.  
Often, interviewees shared a story that prompted another discussion.  I took notes 
throughout the interview to make sure off track discussions, that is, related stories that 
did not specifically answer the question, shifted back on track to ensure an actual 
answer to the question.  In addition, I recorded all of the interviews with permission of 
the participant.  With the help of an undergraduate student, I transcribed all of the 
interviews. 
 The 19 interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to 2 hours and 45 minutes.  
The average length was about one hour.  The longest and shortest interviews warrant 
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further explanation, as the interview context and location played a large role.  This is 
discussed in reference to the validity of the responses later in this chapter. 
 My intent was to do all interviews one-on-one.  However, due to workspace 
setups, time constraints, or interest in participating, there were a few interviews done 
in small groups.  Two interviews included two participants each, and one interview 
included three participants. 
 
Interviewee selection. 
 There are two characteristics of the interviewees that I identified as extremely 
important.  First, they had to have extensive experience in knowing how to design the 
cone of uncertainty, and second, they had to have extensive experience in 
communicating to the public (or other key audiences) about the cone of uncertainty.  
After these two requirements, my goal was to include a wide array of views from the 
weather field including interviewees from different agencies within the government, 
private sector companies, and broadcast meteorologists.  With all of this in mind, the 
sampling strategy was purposive in design. 
 The interviews started with a key informant who is a former director of 
NOAA’s NHC.  This interviewee provided names and contacts for other potential 
interviewees creating a snowball sampling effect.  I still used purposive sampling to 
round out the institutional dimensions of the interviewees.  Additionally, with the 
informant’s help and another work colleague’s assistance, I also conducted interviews 
at the NHC in Miami, FL.  The NHC was supportive of this research, and provided 






In total, there were 19 participants in the study.  Eleven participants are 
employed with the government, though they come from a variety of backgrounds.  The 
government interviewees include employees from the NHC, National Weather Service 
(NWS) local offices, NWS Headquarters, the National Center for Environmental 
Prediction, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  Out of the 
sample, four participants are currently employed as broadcast meteorologists, though 
it should be noted that the sample includes a total of six experienced broadcast 
meteorologists.  The sample also includes four participants who are currently 
employed in private sector weather companies, which includes both weather 
forecasting companies as well as weather graphic companies.  The sample includes 17 
males and 2 females.  Although the weather community has made great strides to 
encourage more women to enter the field of meteorology, at high levels it is not 
entirely surprising to see such a low balance between male and females.  Because the 
sample of females is so small, I will refer to the interviewees using male pronouns to 
disguise the identity of the two females.  
 
Validity and Bias 
  A closer look at interview locations and their effect on interview responses. 
 Interviews started in March of 2006 and continued through to January 2007.  I 
conducted most of the interviews at the interviewee’s place of employment, but four 
of the interviewees were conducted at conferences such as the American 
Meteorological Society’s Annual Meeting, and the National Hurricane Conference.  
Two locations in particular raise questions about the validity of the data.  I discuss the 
implications of these locations in more detail below. 
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 I conducted three out of the four broadcast meteorologist interviews at their 
respective stations.  As with many TV stations, desk space is not always in private 
offices.  Rather, the desks are located among many colleagues at times making it 
difficult to hear.  Further, there were times where the interview was interrupted, as 
another meteorologist had to record their weather forecast preventing the interviewee 
from continuing their thought.  More importantly, interviews conducted in these 
locations raise validity concerns. 
 As Weiss (1994, 148) states, “But while we as interviewers can anticipate that 
we will be told the truth, we cannot assume that we will be told the whole truth nor the 
precise truth.”  Although the interviewees appeared candid in their responses, other 
coworkers, colleagues, or even supervisors might have been in the room preventing 
the interviewee from speaking openly about a particular topic.  Although this case 
study does not seem controversial or in conflict with a more senior colleague, some 
interviewees expressed frustrations with institutional constraints, abrupt software 
changes, or marketing pressures.  With the possibility of a colleague overhearing these 
statements, an interviewee may not offer the ‘precise truth,’ impacting the validity of 
this study.  
 Another interviewee location of concern was at the NHC.  There are two main 
reasons why the interview conditions may affect the validity of this data: The 
aftermath of the Bill Proenza term, and the formation of Hurricane Dean.  First, the 
interviews conducted at the NHC took place in August of 2007 just after the then 
Director of the NHC, Bill Proenza, was asked to leave.  In light of the controversy, a 
study was conducted, and the results uncovered many concerns.  A Miami Herald 
article on May 2, 2008, states,  
Last year’s leadership crisis and staff mutiny at the National Hurricane Center 
exposed deep-rooted personal and departmental jealousies and frustrations that 
left many employees thoroughly demoralized, according to a study by 
independent experts.   
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The study found that support personnel described hurricane forecasters as 
“prima donnas,” “elitist” and “arrogant,” female employees struggled to be 
heard, management allowed problems to fester and some “introverted” 
scientists were intimidated into silence. 
The sentiments expressed in this report represent the feelings of the interviewees at the 
time the interviews were conducted.  This turmoil could have undeniably influenced 
what the interviewees said, and how they stated it.    
 To complicate the responses at NHC, Hurricane Dean formed in the Atlantic 
during my visit at NHC.  The timing of my visit had been carefully planned with the 
trip not scheduled until the Atlantic looked clear from storms. However, shortly after 
my arrival, a tropical low formed off the coast of Africa.  Forty-eight hours into the 
trip, Hurricane Dean formed and the NHC turned into a well-oiled forecasting 
machine.  The issue was that an interview to discuss the cone of uncertainty was 
clearly not as important as actually designing the cone for a current hurricane, Dean.  
In addition, after the hurricane formed, the forecasters who had volunteered their time 
to participate in this study either could not make their interview or had to cut it short 
due to weather briefings.  The longest interview as part of this study was conducted at 
the NHC, but it was before Hurricane Dean formed. 
 The concern about all of these interview conditions is their combined effect on 
the validity of the data.  According to Brinberg and McGrath (1982, 12), there are two 
specific validity concerns.  First, they describe a concept called validity as value, 
which describes the efforts by the researcher to ensure the gathering of truthful or real 
data.  The interviewees in the above conditions were not dishonest, but because of the 
environment the interview was conducted in, they may not have been wholly candid.  
With all of the negative press that the NHC received during the Proenza term, the 
participants may have held back information, or perhaps stated positions that went 
with ‘party lines.’  To counter this, I tried to ask many follow up questions including 
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questions focusing on the history of the graphic.  Historical discussions allowed me to 
see if there were any gaps or large changes in their statements, and further allowed me 
to compare their statements for consistency with the other participants.    
The second validity issue concerns the extent to which all the data has the 
ability for comparison.  Called comparison validity (Brinberg and McGrath, 1982, 15), 
this applies to those interviews that were in the above conditions compared to those 
that were in private settings.  The question raised is whether the data are comparable.  
Although there are concerns about the openness of all the interviews, the data 
collected from these interviews were consistent with the privately conducted 
interviews.  Most, if not all, of the questions in the interview protocol could be 
answered without providing contentious information.  If respondents offered 
contentious information, it was because they felt comfortable doing so, not because 
they were prompted.  Additionally, potentially ‘contentious information’ often times 
did not specifically pertain to the discussion of the cone of uncertainty, but rather on 
institutional constraints. 
 Further, another concept of validity known as communicative validity suggests 
that validity requires testing the knowledge claims provided, in this case, through the 
interviews.  Kvale (2002, 313) states, “Valid knowledge is not merely obtained by 
approximations to a given social reality; it involves a conversation about the social 
reality: What is a valid observation is decided through the argumentation of the 
participants in discourse.”  The social reality happened to include environments that 
may have restrained the forecaster from providing some information, or as in the NHC 
case, may have authorized them to give a critical point of view.  Neither of these 
situations, in the view of the researcher, ever jeopardized the data collected.   
In addition, any data that included an institutional opinion, which may have 
been tainted by some of the above situations, were coded as such, and are not included 
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in this particular study.  The institutional components are very informative, but unless 
the data pertained to the research questions at hand, they were not included in this 
study.  To ensure the inclusion of relevant institutional components, I doubled coded 
certain quotes.  For example, some broadcast meteorologists expressed time 
constraints coming from their management level, which subsequently diminishes their 
time to spend on graphics.  For this example, I doubled coded it under institutional 
dimensions as well as under design of graphic (a limitation of the graphical design).  
Another example, which I did not use in this study, is how NBC is owned by another 
parent company.  Some NBC affiliates are making money while others are not.  This 
adds pressure to both the profiting and not profiting stations, but in particular places 
additional stress on those who do make money to make even more profit.  Although 
this is an interesting dimension, it was not clear from the interview data how this 
directly related to visuals.  I may not have asked the right questions, as I was not 
expecting to hear such stories.  A grounded theory approach often discovers new 
issues or concerns.  These dimensions are important, and I may use them for future 
research, but I did not use all of these quotes in this thesis.   
Additionally, the information presented in all the interviews is generally 
consistent with one another further indicating their validity.  This is particularly true 
for the discussion of the message objectives for the cone of uncertainty, which is 
discussed in Chapter 6.   
 
Potential biases from the participants. 
 When using snowball sampling to find interview participants, the researcher 
must always consider the biases of the informant as well as the subsequent interview 
participants.  For example, the key informant, a former NHC Director, was very 
forward about his dislike for the cone of uncertainty.  Knowing this, he might have 
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also provided names of potential participants who feel similarly, potentially skewing 
the data.  As is noted in the chapters that follow, another graphic, the wind probability 
graphic, often came up in discussion possibly indicating the interviewees dislike for 
the cone, and their fondness for newer probabilistic graphics.  Although some 
interviewees mentioned their aversion for the cone of uncertainty, most admitted that 
this graphic would continue to play a vital role in communicating about hurricanes.  
While it is possible that the informant’s interviewee suggestions biased the results, the 
use of purposive sampling of other key hurricane communicators rounded out the 
sample.   
In addition, when I conducted interviews at the NHC, I did not choose who 
participated in an interview.  Rather, a high-level NHC administrator coordinated the 
interviews based on the employees’ forecasting schedule.  I briefed the administrator 
about the project and the types of experiences or backgrounds that were necessary to 
participate.  Once I arrived, the administrator provided names and times of available 
forecasters.   
There are a number of possible concerns with this process.  Although work 
schedules determined who participated, I have no way of knowing if all forecasters 
who met the criteria (of designing or communicating about the cone) were given an 
equal opportunity to participate.  Further, as stated earlier in this chapter, the office 
atmosphere at the NHC was tense due to infighting and conflict with a new director.  It 
is possible that the potential participants’ behavior, attitudes, or opinions during the 
NHC’s tumultuous time influenced who the administrator chose or perhaps prevented 
the administrator from choosing them at all because of other institutional constraints, 
e.g., other superiors not allowing them to participate.  Both the administrator’s bias as 
well as the institutional conditions could have biased the interview results. 
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Although both the key informant and the NHC administrator introduce 
possible bias into the results, the consistency, and yet diversity, across the 
interviewees’ responses suggest a high level of reliability and validity.  Consistency 
presented itself in areas that seemed appropriate such as the objectives of the cone of 
uncertainty, or all of the participants’ hesitancy to communicate behavioral actions, as 
discussed in Chapter 6.  Diversity presented itself through personal stories, or opinions 
regarding graphic design.  Furthermore, to control for potential biases, interviewees 
came from a variety of different institutional contexts, i.e., government, private sector 
weather companies, and broadcast meteorologists.  This helped introduce more 
diversity in interview responses.  There are possible biases, but the consistency and 
diversity of interview responses suggest the reliability and validity of the results.  
 
 Potential biases from the researcher. 
 Prior to graduate studies, I worked professionally for three years full time with 
the American Meteorological Society (AMS).  It was during this time that the United 
States experienced two of its most active hurricane seasons, 2004 and 2005; the nation 
witnessed one of the most destructive and costly hurricanes, Hurricane Katrina; and 
the meteorological community realized that the cone of uncertainty became the focus 
of a hurricane track mishap with Hurricane Charley.  I am passionately involved with 
hazards from the societal impacts of Katrina to the visual problems of the cone of 
uncertainty.  I admit that there is much passion behind this study to not only further 
communication research, but also provide insight for the meteorological community as 
well.  
 In light of this, it is important to discuss the possible biases that I may bring to 
this study, and the ways that I controlled for these biases, if possible.  According to 
Weiss, a researcher’s bias introduces itself into a study through their presentation, 
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questions, and reactions to questions (1994, 212).  Looking at the role of presentation, 
in order to gain respect from some of the interviewees, I used my insider approach, 
that is, I explained my work experience with the AMS.  When I explained that I am a 
graduate student at Cornell, I could feel the tension that followed.  My interpretation is 
that they did not want to interview with someone who did not understand 
meteorology.  Knowing this, I always told the interviewees that although I have no 
formal education in meteorology, my AMS experience provided a considerable 
overview of the field.  Once I mentioned who I worked for, and who I worked with, 
they immediately perked up.  This presentation style made asking follow-up questions 
rather difficult, as I wanted the participants to state the science for the record.  Often 
times, they assumed I understood the science or the institutional process. 
 As stated in the section to follow, I had four areas of questions related to the 
cone of uncertainty, some of which pertained to the technical side of designing the 
cone.  Often times, when interviewees responded, they assumed I knew the entire 
structure of their institution, or that I understood every technical term they used.  
Although I have a lot of general knowledge in this area, I simply do not know it all.  
The integrity of the data depends on gathering full responses without any assumptions 
of my understanding.  As Creswell (2003, 196) suggests, one way to increase the 
validity of qualitative data is for an author to use rich, thick description.  To control 
for this, then, I asked many follow-up questions to gather a richer description.  I soon 
realized, though, that for some participants, if I said, “I do not understand,” then they 
became slightly frustrated.  On the other hand, many other participants were happy to 
provide more explanation.  In the end, there are parts of a couple of interviews where I 
do not have full understanding of what they mean.  For example, I did not fully 
understand, even after some explanation, all the different types of track error to design 
the cone of uncertainty.  There are horizontal, vertical and cross track errors.  My lack 
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of understanding regarding this type of data, did little to change the integrity of the 
data.    
 The third area that Weiss states introduces bias is with the author’s response to 
questions.  This was a challenge.  Often times, when a participant gave their 
explanation, I followed up with an unbiased question such as, “Could you tell more?” 
or “Why is that?”  I tried to use very simple follow up questions that would not allow 
me to introduce my opinion.  However, with a topic that I feel so passionately about, I 
admit that at times follow up questions became more of a discussion with the 
participant versus an interview.  Once I realized that I was in the process of doing this, 
I would immediately change my language and use words that turned it into a question 
versus a statement.  I would also change my language to reflect, “some people suggest 
that,” versus “I feel that.”  Having visited New Orleans after Katrina, I feel strongly 
about societal impacts of hurricanes.  Most often, my opinions began to slip out during 
discussions of Hurricane Charley.  As I conducted more interviews, I became much 
more aware of my biases.  I controlled for them as much as I could by changing my 
language, and writing notes on a pad of paper to remind me to rephrase certain 
questions. 
 Reflecting on this, the author of any study bridging two disciplines will come 
across certain barriers.  No one can expect to be an expert in every area.  As I 
conducted more interviews, I learned how to phrase follow-up questions to gather a 
thicker description, and learned how to rephrase questions to reduce my own bias.  
Perhaps, if I knew more meteorology, the interview process would be smoother.  
However, I think there are benefits to being part insider and part outsider to the field.  
Gathering more data about how the forecasters design the cone is helpful to this study.  
If I assumed that I knew all about the science, I am certain I would have missed some 
very informative information.  The outsider aspect provided me the opportunity to 
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gather more information, while the insider view granted me more respect from the 




 After transcribing the interviews with the help from an undergraduate student, 
I initially coded the interviews using Atlas.ti, qualitative coding software.  From the 
beginning of the coding process, I used four specific codes that match the categories 
used for the interview protocol.  The four primary codes include audience analysis, 
message objectives, behavioral response, and design techniques.  From there, the 
analysis used in vivo coding where phrases presented in the sentence became the code 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Once a number of codes emerged, I grouped or combined 
the codes, and then used them consistently for the rest of the interviews.  In total, there 
were 52 codes, but only 24 codes had 10 or more quotes associated with them.  The 
other codes were from in vivo coding that ended up not being as useful.  
 After I finished the first round of coding, the second round of coding began, 
which included recoding the four primary codes from above by hand to develop a 
better sense of the emergent themes.  Once I knew what the emergent themes were, 
and further developed them with the literature, I started one last round of coding using 
Atlas.ti.  For example, when the coding initially started, coding for message objective 
was sufficient.  After realizing that there were multiple ideas in this one code, I split 
the code into three parts including uncertainty, impacts/risks, and confidence. 
 
 Presentation and Variety of Quotes. 
 During the writing of the first draft of this thesis, I assigned every interviewee 
a number.  Every time I used a quote in the results section, I also inserted the 
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interviewee’s number to ensure a variety of quotes.  The reason for this is that 
inserting the numbers allowed me to ensure that I was including responses from a 
variety of institutions, as well as from all the interviewees.  The numbers are not 
included in the current document.  The reason for this is that using the numbers allows 
the reader to group the quotes and potentially identify who the interviewee is.  Where 
appropriate, the presentation of the quotes includes the interviewee’s general 
institution, that is, government, private sector weather company, or broadcast 
meteorologist.  
 This study does not use names, and if possible, does not identify specific 
institutions.  If a quote specifically mentions an institution, I tried to disguise it by 
inserting “company x.”  Some quotes, however, were very difficult to disguise the 
institution, as the wording of the response may give it away.  This is why names are 
also not used.  Although many of the participants gave permission to use names, I 
decided that keeping all sources anonymous increased the integrity of the research.  
The focus of this research is to further visual communication theory, as well as 
provide insight into a hazard graphic.  The goal is not to identify which forecaster 
likes or dislikes the graphic and why.  Additionally, the meteorological community is 
a tight-knit community.  Although I feel that all the quotes used in this study are 
respectful, it is possible that someone within that community may feel otherwise.  To 
protect my participants, and increase the integrity of this research, I did not use names. 
 The presentation of the data includes many quote examples as well as 
supporting evidence and discussion.  During the interviews, some participants hinted 
at other government programs or other news stories that supported their responses.  I 
researched these programs and added this supporting material to the discussion 
sections of the respective results section.  At times, the supporting material is quite 
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extensive, placing the emphasis more on the discussion and less on the quotes.  This is 
not to overshadow the quotes, but to enhance the material presented. 
 
Generalizability 
According to Brinberg & McGrath, generalizability is “the degree to which a 
set of concepts and findings will hold up when extrapolated, or generalized, or 
extended to materials not yet brought under research inquiry (1982, 12).  This study 
takes a qualitative approach, which only touches the surface of exploring the life of 
one visual.  The data in this study are not generalizable according to the above 
definition. 
There is, however, an alternative description of generalizability known as 
transferability.  This concept applies to the extent to which the results have the ability 
to ‘transfer’ to different contexts.  The difference is the emphasis on the researcher’s 
opinion of how transferable the results are to other areas of research (Trochim, 2006).  
Since this is a qualitative study, the results are presented in two parts.  First, there are 
the issues developed from the case study that pertain to the weather community.  
Secondly, there are theoretical or conceptual questions posed as they emerge from the 
case study.  The questions asked are not presented as facts, but as points for further 
inquiry.  If the results are in the form of questions, then the questions are transferable 




 This chapter provided an overview of the methods used, biases considered, and 
validity and generalizability of this study.  The next four chapters present results and 
their respective discussions.  The first of these, Chapter 4 will discuss the types of 
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communication used in meteorology as well as identify the users of the cone of 




TRANSMISSIONS, TRANSACTIONS, AND DEFICITS: THE TYPES OF 
COMMUNICATION IN METEOROLOGY 
 
Overview 
 The first step in understanding the life of a visual is to investigate the visual’s 
origins.  To do this, this chapter will: 
• Explore the institutions that create the cone of uncertainty 
• Identify and characterize the receivers of this visual information 
• Gain a better understanding of how forecasters communicate with their 
audience 
• Examine if forecasters treat visual messages differently than verbal or written 
messages 
This chapter has three sections that elaborate on the above points.  The quotes used to 
make these points fall under the audience analysis code mentioned in the methods 
section.  Throughout the entire chapter, questions are posed for future research.   
 
Do Meteorologists Follow a Transmission View of Communication with the Public? 
Much of the literature on science communication suggests that scientists 
interact with the public in a transmission view of communication.  That is, scientists 
simply transmit or send their information to the public with limited to no feedback 
with the public.  This chapter shows that the forecasters in this case study follow this 
same model. 
Take for example, a quote from one meteorologist who was answering a 
question regarding the objective of the cone of uncertainty.  This meteorologist gave a 
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non-traditional answer stating, “The whole purpose of a graphic is that you should be 
able to understand what it is by looking at it.”  He continued, “If you’re providing 
people graphical representations, it should be clear enough that they understand what 
it means so that they can make a decision about their actions.”  The implication is that 
the forecasters disseminate, or transmit, the information without any mention of 
interaction with the public.   
Another example is more impact focused.  A government meteorologist stated, 
“We produce the meteorology, the impacts, the expected impacts on the infrastructure 
and on people’s lives.  It’s something we can communicate, but they [emergency 
managers] have the responsibility for protecting when push comes to shove.”  Again, 
there is a message that he will communicate, or transmit, the science, and the 
associated impacts to the public, but all other decisions and discussions will be made 
on an individual or a county emergency manager level.  Furthermore, if the public has 
questions regarding evacuations or potential impacts, the meteorologists are sending 
them to an outside party limiting, severing, or rerouting all feedback from the public. 
Yet another example shows how little meteorologists understand their public, 
despite their outreach efforts and marketing pleas.  One broadcast meteorologist 
stated: 
I never really went out to you know, from the social science perspective, went 
out to understand my audience because we can broadcast to every single 
person watching NBC at the same time.  If they were all watching Channel 4, 
my audience is a 9 year old to a 100 year old person, so you know, some are 
making decisions and some could care less. 
It is true that the nature of broadcast meteorology requires communicating to a large 
and diverse audience, but this suggests that every city, every station audience across 
the country should be treated equally.  It also implies that there is very little audience 
analysis or interaction further implying a transmission view of communication.  
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The transmission view of communication is not ideal for many reasons.  As 
stated in the literature view, Gregory and Miller (1998, 104) suggest, “Media 
audiences have to do work.”  They must understand, interpret, and retain the 
information they gather.  The problem is that the forecaster has no idea what 
information that person understood, interpreted or retained.  Further, the forecasters 
are also unaware of whether it is an accurate account of the information, noting that 
there are a variety of accurate accounts.  This leaves the public vulnerable to their 
potentially inaccurate interpretations, or alternatively, the public will become 
information seekers in a quest to find answers to their questions or to calm their 
anxieties.  All of this occurs because the current structure does not allow for a 
feedback loop, which subsequently forces forecasters to follow a transmission view of 
communication with the viewing audience.  
Of potential greater concern is the fact that researchers and public officials 
know that there are some erroneous interpretations of the cone of uncertainty graphic.  
Broad et al. (2007) show that news media coverage has a plethora of titles for the 
graphic.  Despite the graphical intent to show the uncertainty of the track of the storm, 
the graphic has been given names such as the “cone of probability,” or “cone of 
death.”  These names do not accurately capture the message intent, and potentially 
may perplex some of the public. 
What’s more is that not only are media viewers capturing the title wrong, but 
the USACE’s report suggests that the public at large are also misinterpreting the 
graphical intent, subsequently making poor decisions.  The report, completed after the 
hurricane season of 2004, noted that not only did the public misinterpret the graphic, 
so too did the emergency managers, those responsible for evacuation orders.  This 
action led to mass evacuation of one community, the Tampa Bay area, and to mass 
chaos to a community further south, the Port Charlotte area.  The USA Today on 
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August 15, 2004, captured one woman’s shock, “"I was surprised it hit here," she 
sighs, as she pokes through the rubble of her home, salvaging photos of her daughter, 
son and late husband.  "They all said it was going to hit Tampa. Then it turned"” 
(McCarthy, 2004).   
Indeed, this woman is not entirely mistaken.  Hurricane forecasters predicted a 
hit to the Tampa area.  Hurricane Charley’s eye, or the center of the storm, was 
projected to hit Tampa, but as the graphic clearly shows in Image 3, the Port Charlotte 
area was in the cone of uncertainty.  Why, then, is there all of this confusion? 
Although the answer to that question is beyond the scope of this case study, 
one potential variable is the fact that forecasters have limited interaction with the 
public.  Following the transmission view of communication may be detrimental to the 
public’s understanding of hurricane uncertainty.  There is no one to clear their 
confusion or answer their questions.  Why do forecasters follow this model? 
 
Is There Room for Transactional Communication in Meteorology? 
The transmission model is how it appears they communicate, but the more 
important question is why.  To look at this dimension, one must flip the question.  
Instead of asking how scientists are communicating with the public, the focus is now 
on how scientists think they are communicating with their various audiences.  Is it 
simply transmission communication, or does the type of communication depend on the 
audience? 
The interviewees have a diverse audience, but depending on which institution 
the forecaster belongs to will slightly change the nature of their audience.  First, 
looking at government institutions such as the NWS and the NHC, both of which are 
under the NOAA, their primary audience is simply everyone.  One government 
interviewee stated, “Any product produced by taxpayer’s money goes to everybody all 
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at the same time.  I can’t just say, “Hey, we have a really good product here, let’s just 
send this to the emergency managers, and military, and not give it to my kids at home 
and the public.’ We can’t act like that.”   
All government products, text or visual, must be available to everyone.  With 
the rise of the Internet, this is now a functional policy, but interestingly enough, prior 
to the Internet, information was not available to everyone and was transmitted via 
radio to researchers and broadcast meteorologists.  Most people received their weather 
information from TV broadcast meteorologists.  Why, then, does this policy need to be 
in place now? Is it a flawed policy to treat scientists and the public the same?  Can the 
public understand the same concepts and products that scientists understand?  Further, 
was this a conscience decision to treat everyone the same? Or, could it have been the 
rise of the Internet that changed how NOAA interacted with all of its taxpaying 
customers? 
What’s more, just because information is available on the Internet does not 
necessarily equate to the “public” receiving the information.  With only 68% of 
Americans with Internet service, this policy still segregates the other 32% of people 
who do not have access (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008).  In fact, one government 
forecaster recognized this issue by stating, “It is the age of the Internet and the age of 
technology, but I would survey how many people really have access to these 
computers.”  Despite the forecaster’s well intentions not to “act like that,” NOAA is 
still in fact weighting their customers differently by those who have the technology, 
and those who do not. 
Further, one government forecaster admitted that not all taxpaying customers 
receive equal treatment.  They claimed:  
No, I would say the audience is what it is.  I would say that for this particular 
graphic, because it’s on the web, we know people well beyond the emergency 
management community will look at it. But, in terms of doing a survey and 
 43
sending it out there, we wanted to make sure the message coming back from 
the emergency management community wasn’t diluted. Look, you can say all 
of your customers are equal alright, but the emergency manager community is 
more than a customer to us.  They are our partners. 
Emergency managers played a large role in all of the interviews, but in 
particular, emergency managers came out on top of the audience analysis.  All of the 
19 meteorologists interviewed included emergency managers as a key component of 
their audience.  As the quote states above, the interviewees consider them more than 
an audience, but a partner.  It is this recognition that elevates the level of 
communication that emergency managers receive.  The transmission view of 
communication no longer applies to this subsection of their audience, as 
meteorologists determined that feedback is essential for emergency managers to make 
their critical evacuation decisions.  
For example, the FEMA in partnership with the NHC and NWS, created what 
is called the hurricane liaison team, which is a coordination call for federal, state and 
local emergency managers and decision makers that will potentially be affected by the 
pending storm.  FEMA created the hurricane liaison team in part because of massive 
time constraints from the NHC.  One government forecaster described the history for 
its creation and its subsequent utility: 
Now these same people [emergency managers] who have been to the [training] 
workshops, they know the hurricane forecasters, and they know the NHC 
director.  They would call down, and we would make them mad.  We couldn’t 
answer the phones.  I can’t call in from home during a landfall event.  We’re 
just so saturated down there.  It’s not a matter of having more phones.  I don’t 
have enough people on the telephones. So FEMA came in on their white horse 
years ago, and together we partnered to develop this hurricane liaison team.  In 
Katrina, for example, we’re talking to FEMA headquarters, the regional FEMA 
offices from LA westward, Region 4 in Savannah, MS, eastward.  And, very 
importantly the state emergency operation centers are on there.  So, we had 
TX, LA, MS, AL, FL and GA all on the conference call.  Our job is to do the 
meteorology in five minutes or so, and then let them do the emergency 
management process … [we] make sure that they’re talking to us, and that they 
understand the uncertainty. 
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  This one forecaster sheds light on many issues that came up from other 
forecasters representing all institutions.  First, time is of great importance during a 
pending storm.  Forecasters are working around the clock incorporating the most 
current data into their models and forecasts.  Depending on where the interviewees 
work, they must update text products, online broadcasts, static TV products (i.e., 
weather on the 8’s on The Weather Channel, NBC Weather Plus, etc.), and of course, 
their live TV news products, and in the case of the NHC, live media interviews.  
Organizing this national team of forecasters to predict and communicate severe 
weather requires structure, standards and time to ensure the continuous timely 
dissemination of forecasts across the country.  This dedicated time ensures that at bare 
minimum the information regarding the hurricane is transmitted.  If the audience is 
unaware of the storm and its potential track, then they cannot take any precautionary 
actions. The key component is transmission.  
Second, the quote highlights two ways transactional communication infiltrates 
the system, between the meteorology community and the emergency managers as well 
as within the meteorology community.  Taking a closer look at the emergency 
manager community, it is not difficult to understand why emergency managers are so 
closely related to the forecast message.  Emergency managers make evacuation 
decisions based on the best available information.  The issue is the information is 
complex, plentiful, and fraught with uncertainty.  Despite the forecaster’s intent to 
have a consistent message, inconsistencies can be seen in the design of graphics and 
message objectives presented, which causes confusion and frustration on the part of 
emergency managers. 
While this complex situation does exist, meteorologists understand that 
emergency managers are the link between their forecast message and the public.  The 
decisions made by these emergency managers will affect thousands if not millions of 
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people.  Thus, it is in the forecaster’s best interest to ensure that these partners 
understand the forecast.  What makes communication easier with this population is 
that it is a known population.  Forecasters, through FEMA, know who the emergency 
managers are.  The coordination calls are setup such that all stakeholders are 
identified.  Additionally, everyone on the call has a similar purpose to make the best 
decision possible to protect the lives and property of every person in harms way.  This 
makes the interaction among the call participants much more focused allowing the 
meteorologists to focus on the uncertainty of their forecast, and the emergency 
managers to focus on any relevant questions regarding the potential risks for their 
geographic area.   
Despite this transaction, forecasters still show signs of frustration with 
emergency managers.  Take for example, the following series of responses regarding 
Hurricane Charley.  The discussion focused on the forecaster’s perspective on why 
emergency manager’s decideded not to evacuate even though their location was just 
south of the “skinny black line”: 
 G Who do you think the emergency managers are listening to?  
Are they looking at these graphics?  
Interviewee  The emergency managers are coordinating very closely with the 
National Hurricane Center. 
G Okay so in terms of Port Charlotte and the border area? 
Interviewee  Again, what part of hurricane warning don’t you [the 
emergency managers] understand? Yeah. Evacuation levels 
would have been a little different if the emergency managers, 
and it would depend on the geography of course, but if you’re 
expecting a high end 1 or a low end 2 [hurricane] versus a low 
end 4 the evacuation would be a little different. However, in this 
case it wasn’t so much of the storm surge problem because of 
the track the storm would take. This was a wind event. But, I go 
back to my original statement: What part of a hurricane warning 
don’t you [they] understand? 
The forecaster admits that every situation is different.  They acknowledge that 
category size and the specific threats from each hurricane vary from storm to storm.  
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Despite the fact that the hurricane liaison calls exist, emergency managers may still 
have questions unanswered.  Although the forecaster just openly discussed the 
complications of geography, winds, and surge, he ends with a conflicting, “What part 
of hurricane warning don’t you understand?”  If every hurricane warning were the 
same, emergency managers would not need clarification.  Some forecasters still fail to 
recognize why transactional communication is so important. 
Although transactional communication exists with the emergency management 
community, it is important to note that it takes a third party such as FEMA, to 
complete the feedback loop between emergency managers and meteorologists.  This is 
not a positive or negative component, but it does raise the question of whether or not a 
third party, such as FEMA, is required to make transactional communication occur 
between scientists and their associated partners.  Does this theme repeat itself in other 
governmental contexts or in other institutional settings?  
Exploring another institutional setting, there is at least one additional scenario 
where transactional communication comes into play.  By the nature of their business, 
the private sector has paid customers many of whom are emergency managers, but 
also include the energy and oil industry, and trucking and aviation companies, just to 
name a few.  In essence, these customers pay for specialized transactional 
communication.  For example, one private sector meteorologist explained: 
So we're not conveying to the general public and therefore, we don't feel 
compelled or constrained by what the official government line [forecast] is. If 
we tell Utility A that we think their assets are more at risk, then we're going to 
say it out loud until they pay us all the money for that service. There's a lot of 
hand holding that goes into that.  That service is really where they're paying 
money, for that hand holding.  They can ask questions or even banter with our 
meteorologists, and in that discussion process now it's a human discussion 
process.  The uncertainty is conveyed to them and they are presumably making 
better tactical and strategic decisions because they now understand the 
certainty better than the line and the red area and the yellow area that you see 
on TV.  
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This forecaster clarifies that the paid service includes the right to, “ask questions or 
even banter with our meteorologists.”  Forecasting takes a lot of time and thought, 
thought that is not always easily explained.  The time it takes to offer explanations has 
a value, a monetary one.  Those who value transactional communication will 
ultimately come forth, if it is in their benefit to do so.  For many of the oil companies 
in the Gulf Coast, they have people and profit at stake, and a service such as the one 
described above is worth every penny. 
 Another private sector forecaster explained their interaction with customers:  
Most of them [emergency managers] know who I am and know me. I’ve given 
them my card. They have my email. I get a lot of them, and we also have 
conference calls with them at [Company X] so they’re able to talk to me and 
ask me about what impacts do I expect. Do we think it’s coming my way? And 
we arrange those. I don’t arrange them, somebody arranges them and I show 
up and give them my best estimate: I don’t currently think its going to hit you, 
that’s my opinion, you may have to make your choice based on the official 
National Hurricane Center forecast… 
In this passage, it is unclear whether the emergency managers pay for this service, but 
it furthers the idea that customers of private sector weather companies have access to 
specialized communication. 
 Both government and private sector institutions appear to identify a subset of 
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the public worthy of transactional communication.  The institutions under NOAA 
identify emergency managers for this specialized communication; whereas the private 
sector companies identify their paying costumers.  None of the institutions prioritizes 
the general public as having a need for transactional communication.  Thus, the farther 
away you travel from the main source, the meteorologists, the less likely one will 
experience transactional communication.  Emergency managers, the partners, and paid 
customers will receive focused attention as time allows, whereas the public, being the 
farthest removed from forecasters, will have limited transactions, and is much more 
likely to experience a transmission view of communication.  Figure 2 summarizes this 
finding. 
 Although the transmission view of communication characterizes most of 
science communication, the finding above suggests that there are levels of increased 
communication within the source’s audience.  It seems plausible that all scientific 
contexts have varying levels of communication, noting that the similarity is that the 
public receives the least attention. 
The highest degree of transactional communication should occur within the 
meteorology community, the main source.  Recall one of the forecaster’s dismay with 
emergency managers when he stated, “What part of hurricane warning do they not 
understand?”  What perhaps makes this statement so intriguing is the fact that much 
coordination, and transactional communication, occurs before implementing such a 
simple, understandable warning.  It is possible that warnings are not so easily to 
understand after all.  One forecaster described this process: 
Right before every forecast is issued by the NHC, we have a hurricane hotline 
call with all of the potentially impacted local national weather services offices.  
In Katrina, we were talking to the Houston office, Lake Charles, Slidell, New 
Orleans, Mobile, and Tallahassee.  We hadt the whole gulf covered basically 
right there.  We had the river forecast center online, the guys who do the flood 
forecast for the rivers.  We had HPC, the hydrometeorological prediction 
center online, the rainfall experts.  We had the storm prediction center people 
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up there from Norman OK, who help us with tornados.  We had all the experts 
giving us input to come up with the advisory.  But then after that, and the dept 
of defense is online too, maybe Norfolk or Jacksonville for example,  
somebody at NASA … Anybody can speak up.  If they don’t understand 
something, they can speak up and say how come you’re doing this or explain 
that.  We’ll try to explain why we’re doing what we’re doing.  After that, we 
finish up all the products and transmit those. 
This is probably the most exhaustive explanation of what happens directly before 
products, such as the cone of uncertainty, are issued as well as an indication that 
meteorologists of all types are communicating with one another.  One distinction must 
be made clear though.  All of the folks mentioned in the above quote are from the 
government.  It is clear that government meteorologists from the NHC to the NWS to 
the National Severe Storms Lab to the military are communicating with one another, 
but where is the rest of the field?  
 Interestingly enough, only the government forecasters in the sample 
commented about non-governmental meteorologists, while private sector 
meteorologists did not hint at any interaction with the government.  The reason for this 
might be that the NHC issues the official forecast.  Most private sector meteorologists 
will not deviate from this track, as the meteorological field knows how important it is 
to have a consistent message to the public.  For example, one private sector 
meteorologists stated: 
Oh, we always verify what’s happened. My boss is very big on that and he 
watches religiously, says, “[Name], you know, are you sure”. He plays the 
devil’s advocate and we really, most of the time, are not much different track 
and turning wise from the Hurricane Center.  Most of the time we’re the same, 
and we’re evaluating the impacts, which they don’t provide directly.  It’s only 
in some cases where I’m absolutely confident it’s not going there.  
Another broadcast meteorologist expressed his sentiment,  
Well, because I knew that people would look at the edge of the cone to 
determine whether they were in or whether they were out, and I didn’t want it 
to be the in on Channel 4, but out in the NHC or some other thing,  I have been 
espousing for ever that there is no upside to using any other cone other than the 
NHC cone.  There is only a downside. 
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Although the sample for this study is small, it is safe to say that the field of 
meteorology resonates with the interviewees’ sentiments.  This lack of deviation may 
also explain why a private sector meteorologist may not need to interact with 
government forecasters.   
 Government forecasters, on the other hand, did mention interaction or the 
importance of interaction with private sector meteorologists, though the responses are 
conflicting.  One forecaster said,  
We’ll talk to anybody, sure.  They can call and some do, they will call or 
email, and we’ll treat them like we would anybody, sure.  There is no problem 
there.  
This implies that there is interaction between the government forecasters and private 
sector forecasters, whereas the quote below suggests limited communication with only 
a few people. 
No, the [private sector] meteorologists are not talking to us with just a couple 
of exceptions.  The local TV meteorologists here, some of them will talk to us.  
[The Weather Channel] will call us … Accuweather doesn’t talk to us.  They 
just insult us.  
The potential difference between the two interviewees might be their placement in the 
chain of command.  The higher your leadership position, the more communication you 
have with your audience.  The interviewee below identified broadcast meteorologists 
as another partner, similar to the emergency managers. 
I personally don’t think the Weather Service sees the media complication.  
They, [broadcast meteorologists], are critical.  They are partners, right.  They 
are qualified.  Without the media our message would not get out because this is 
the thing, the reality is that more people get the message from radio or TV or, 
the Internet has been increasing.  In reality, they still get our information, they 
get it from us, and they pass it on …  
In response to a question about training of broadcast meteorologists, one interviewee 
said: 
It seems to me that there has been some discussion on whether we need to do 
that or not, but I don’t know whether, I’m pretty sure we haven’t moved that 
forward in any serious way.  We’re hoping that that they understand. 
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Yet, another government forecaster suggested that broadcast meteorologists may not 
understand or, at the very least, may not be framing the message appropriately: 
It’s almost one of those things that, maybe I sound like I’m blaming the media, 
but I think the media needs to, you know, it needs to be, I mean, hopefully the 
media reads our discussions and can communicate these uncertainties to the 
public. But, I think that was a big issue in that case was the angle it could have 
gone anywhere, anywhere down to the west coast of Florida. We were saying 
that. 
It is apparent that although transactional communication takes place within the 
community, the diverse responses show that there are varying opinions on whether 
transactional communication is necessary.  Although many other interviewees 
mentioned that they attend conferences such as the AMS’s Annual Meeting as well as 
their Broadcast Meteorology Conference and Tropical Meteorology Conference, 
National Hurricane Conference, National Weather Association, etc., the focus at these 
meetings is typically not on the training of new products or how to frame a consistent 
message, but more on research aspects of tropical meteorology. 
 Thus far, this case study shows that science communication is not entirely 
characterized by the transmission model of communication.  Although much of the 
direct communication with the public follows the traditional literature in this area 
(Dornan, 1999; Lewenstein, 1995), the participants have shown that there are layers of 
their audience that require more or less communication, such as with emergency 
managers.  Although it is easy to group all scientists into one category, it is also 
important to recognize the institutional groupings of the scientists, as scientists often 
do not communicate as one group with one voice, as this thesis shows.  As a result, it 
is important to study how scientists within these different institutional contexts interact 
with each other, and as a consequence, how this interaction leads to effective or 
ineffective communication with the audiences to follow. 
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Applications of the Deficit Model: Are Visuals, Text and Verbal Messages Treated 
Equally When Communicating to the Public? 
Organizing a national team of forecasters to predict and communicate severe 
weather requires structure and standards to ensure the continuous timely dissemination 
of forecasts across the country.  Although there are structures and standards for the 
scientific aspects of the process, are there similar standards or structures to 
communicate with the public?  While there are no official policies on this matter, there 
are many unstated official rules to communicating with the public.   
In addition to the unstated rules, the science communication literature also 
offers ideas as to how scientists will communicate with the public.  The deficit model, 
although widely criticized, suggests that the public lacks the foundational knowledge 
required to understand science (Miller, 1998).  With this interpretation, scientists 
potentially respond to this by making educational assumptions regarding their 
audience.  As the concept implies, if the audience has a deficit of scientific knowledge, 
then scientists and media alike have a responsibility to disseminate science 
information in a simplified form.  Society is at an advantage if it has a public that 
knows some science versus no science at all.  The belief is that an audience that has a 
deficit of scientific knowledge is not capable of understanding complicated scientific 
processes.  Scientists and the media must adjust their communication messages 
accordingly.  
Most of the literature in this area focuses on verbal or written messages, that is, 
messages that are written in some form of plain language.  As this case study focuses 
on visuals, the question focuses on whether visuals follow the same type of deficit 




The unstated rules. 
In journalism, it is common to write articles that target a particular reading 
grade level.  In fact, Meyers (2004) concludes that most major newspapers, such as the 
New York Times or the Washington Post, target 6th to 8th grade reading levels.  In 
other words, reading levels are rarely higher than today’s junior high education.  
Science communication, a different form of journalism, acts very similarly.  Many of 
the forecasters provided their insights as to a target grade level.  For example, one 
forecaster stated, “For TV, it used to be 5th grade.”  Yet another example, in response 
to what grade level the interviewees target suggested even lower.  
Lower.  I think it would almost be less, unfortunately. I just feel like you have 
to keep it as simple as you can, yet convey what we want. And I think it’s 
tough and I do think that makes the graphic, may make it hard to understand 
for some people. 
Not only does this quote convey this forecaster’s opinion regarding the education 
level, they also recognize that because of this level the graphic may be difficult to 
understand.  This begins to unveil evidence that visuals are not included in this deficit 
model of communication.  The forecaster just admitted that the education level is 
lower than 8th grade.  If they believe the public will not understand them, then by 
deduction, the graphics target a much higher level of education; higher than at least 8th 
grade. 
Another interviewee refused to answer the question in a traditional form.    
G What level do you write it [text products] to? You know how 
newspapers kind of have a target grade audience. 
 
Interviewee: This is geared for the public 
 
G But if you were to, I mean, the public has a range of education 
and reading levels. Would you say you have a grade level that 
you would, I mean, are you shooting for 8th grade science level? 
A 10th grade science level? 
 
Interviewee: No, there’s no science on this. Just plain language.   
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Although this series of responses is concerning a text product, the response almost 
implies that there is no science education required.  They simply state that it is just 
plain language.   
All of these responses indicate that the target science education level is 
depressingly low signifying that forecasters appear to follow the deficit model of 
science communication.  These examples are also beginning to show signs of unequal 
applications of the deficit model to different modes of communication.  The data are 
beginning to suggest that forecasters apply their ‘simple communication’ to text and 
audio, while they may exclude visuals from this policy.  
 
 Understanding probabilities. 
 Knowing that meteorologists have such low scientific standards for the public, 
it is ironic that this section is on the use of probabilities, which are quite common in 
meteorology.  On the one hand, probabilities play a very important scientific role.  On 
the other hand, the use of probabilities seems to be in direct conflict with the 
determination that the public has little to no scientific literacy.  The use of 
probabilities works against the deficit model approach to communicating science.  
 Prior to the last few years, much of the weather communication with the 
public used deterministic forecasts such as assigning one number to the predicted 
temperature (ex. It will be 62 degrees.)  The alternative is not only to move toward 
ranges (ex. The high temperature will be between 62 and 70), but to also give 
probabilities.  This is much more common for precipitation amounts, i.e., 40% chance 
of rain, or 60% chance of a thunderstorm, etc.  From a scientific point of view, 
probabilities are a more accurate account of the state of the science.  Probabilities are 
explaining the reality they know right now for the future.  Deterministic forecasts are 
only useful for one point in time, i.e. the temperature right now is 62 degrees, etc., but 
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when giving a forecast, that is, the state of the weather sometime in the near future, the 
truth is the science cannot provide the exact future account.  Probabilities are the most 
honest, objective approach to communicating the uncertainty of weather. 
  The issue at hand, then, is how do meteorologists reconcile their use of 
probabilities with the fact that they have determined that their audience’s scientific 
literacy is dismally low?  Further, there are many examples in the literature that 
support the idea that the public as well as educated professionals, misunderstand the 
use of probabilities (See Gordon-Lubitz, 2003; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; 
Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997).  How, then, do scientists conclude that 
probabilities are the way to communicate with the public?  The interviews show that 
there are diverse opinions on this matter. 
 One of the alternative graphical products to the cone of uncertainty is a graphic 
called the tropical storm force wind probabilities graphic.  It shows the wind field for a 
hurricane assigning probabilities to spatial areas for their chance to feel tropical storm 
force winds or above.  To show the complexity of this graphic, this meteorologist 
described: 
We’re showing these wind products in 12 hr increments out to five days.  So 
that’s, ya know, 12, 24, 10 graphics with in five days, 8 products time three, 24 
products.  Most people I would envision this working out to five day 
probability. We also have a text product that goes with that, and this, if you 
know how to use it, is extremely useful...  But, you can go in there and see the 
cumulative probability for each time period, and then the individual 
probability, so it kind of gives you the probability of getting impacted and then 
it, depending on the highest probability, it also gives you the most likely time it 
will impact you.  So there are ways to use this that have much more meaning 
than this simple cone and skinny black line.  
 





First, this is an example of how complex these graphics are to design as well as 
implement in real time.  As the forecaster states, within 5 days he is producing 10 
graphics on this one product alone, not to mention all of the other visual and written 
products he must update during a storm.  It helps to show the complexity of 
communicating hurricane information, which is not something to belittle, and further 
is something that forecasters struggle with every day.  In fact, a recent National 
Academy report titled, “Completing the Forecast,” summarizes the difficulties of 
communicating weather information and identifies areas that are in need of more 
research.  Communicating uncertainty and using probabilistic products are a large 
focus of this study (Ban, Andrew, Brown, & Changnon, 2006). 
Second, the quote shows their recognition that the public will not be able to 
process all of the individual and cumulative probabilities that are shown in the wind 
graphic.  Despite this recognition, the forecaster later followed up with,   
It seems to me that this is where we want to go to let people know number one, 
that we can’t give a perfect forecast, and that there is uncertainty involved, and 
two, we really want them to have a feel for where the storm winds are going to 
be or most likely going to be.  Now, having said that, we’ve got these products 
out there, is that the absolute only way to do it, well of course not.  There are 
multiple ways to do this.  I just feel strongly that we want to convey that 
uncertainty.  Everybody in meteorology is grappling with trying to find out the 
best way to deal with uncertainty. 
Although they admit this graphic may not be the only way to do it, they are 
suggesting, by the combination of these two quotes, that the wind graphic, which uses 
probabilities, will be employed, and the public will not understand it.  This is an 
interesting combination not only because the two statements are in conflict with each 
other, but also because the forecaster is choosing not to apply the deficit model to the 
visual.  This is the second piece of evidence to suggest the exclusion of visuals under 
the deficit model of communication. 
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 Further, another forecaster also suggested that the public has difficulties 
understanding probabilities.  A private sector meteorologist expressed,  
Most of the public, the vast majority of the public, doesn’t know how to 
calibrate scientific statistical statements, i.e., 80% probability, 70% probability 
into action and there is a challenge there to figure out what’s the right way to 
convey the uncertainty, … and get people to translate those uncertainties into 
actions that affect their world. 
Conversely, another government forecaster who uses probabilities suggested that the 
public is capable of understanding, but admits that it is an educational process.  He 
further stated, “Media is extremely critical in doing that, exactly, and the same thing 
would happen with any of the products here.”   
 The use of the words ‘challenge’ and ‘educational process’ indicates a 
difficult, learning curve toward understanding the use of probabilities both in visuals, 
such as the wind graphic, or in text, such as descriptions of a 70% chance of rain.  The 
emphasis on education takes this concept once step further.  It implies that the use of 
probabilities requires an explanation, a verbal explanation.  In the media context, as 
suggested above, when broadcasters explain a graphic using probability, they must 
explain what the graphic means.  One forecaster remarked on how to do so stating,  
Oh yeah, the TV consultants says, ‘talking the weather, don’t talk down to 
them, but don’t throw all the scientific jargon – there’s vorticity next blah, 
blah, blah.’ No, you speak to them in every day plain language. 
This is yet another example of the possible exclusion of visuals and inclusion of 
audio/text as it pertains to the deficit model.   
Forecasters, through their own personal opinions or through TV consultants, 
determined that their audience has a low scientific literacy, and in response to this, the 
public must hear simple, plain language explanations.  Yet, the graphic presented still 
uses difficult, probabilistic scientific concepts that forecasters openly admit are 
difficult for the public to understand.  What characteristic of visuals potentially 
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excludes them from this simple communication process?  Are visuals more useful in 
capturing and communicating intricate scientific phenomena such as uncertainty?  
 
Summary 
 The analysis of the transmissions, transactions, and deficits of how 
communication functions in meteorology begins to shed light on a visual’s life, in 
particular, on a science visual’s life.  Although it would be easy to think of a visual as 
having a linear life juxtaposed between two worlds, those of the creator, the scientists, 
and those of the reader, the many levels of the audience, this case study shows that it is 
not that simple.  The cone of uncertainty sits in a complex web of many creators and 
users (See Figure 3). This chapter identified the creators of the visual, the audience for 
the visual, and the many types of communication that infiltrate the visual 
Figure 3.  The visual process of the cone of uncertainty 
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communication process.  The next chapter will explore the value of written or verbal 




VISUAL VALIDITY: THE VALUE OF EXPLANATION 
 
Overview 
Up until now, this thesis has primarily focused on the forecasters that creates 
the visual, who these forecasters communicate it to, and how.  This chapter focuses its 
attention on potential characteristics of science visuals, specifically trying to explore if 
science visuals always need explanation, or alternatively, if they can stand-alone.  To 
do this, this chapter will:  
• Develop and define visual validity, 
• Explore whether the cone of uncertainty can act as a stand alone graphic, 
• Determine what the cone of uncertainty needs to ensure high visual validity. 
This chapter brings together examples from both science, the cone of uncertainty, as 
well as an example from art to strengthen the definition of visual validity.  The quotes 
used in this chapter fall under the value of explanation code, which I developed during 
the second phase of coding.  
 
The Value of Explanation 
Much of the controversy regarding the cone of uncertainty indicates that 
people direct more of their attention to the visual rather than listening to associated 
explanations.  One forecaster stressed the importance of explanation,  
I don’t have a problem with that at all [putting the skinny black line on the 
cone], but you’ve got to make sure you’ve got the cone up there and emphasize 
that this is our margin of error, and notice it expands the farther we go out in 
time … They’ve [broadcasters] got to beat that into the ground of the viewers.  
You’ve got to harp on it. 
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 The forecaster was passionately expressing the need to emphasize what the visual 
means to the viewers.  If broadcasters are “beating that into the ground of the 
viewers,” and if they are listening to it, then one would surmise that the public would 
interpret the graphic correctly.  Yet, as the literature has pointed out, there is some 
evidence to suggest that this is not the case.  This leads to three questions: (1) what is 
preventing the public from focusing on the verbal message, (2) what is potentially 
wrong with the graphic that it is leading to costly misinterpretations, and (3) can a 
science visual without an explanation prompt one of the many correct interpretations? 
The first two questions are beyond the scope of this study, but warrant further 
attention.  A combination of the visual literature as well as the forecasters’ comments, 
can offer some insight into the latter question.  First, what does it mean to stand alone, 
and what are the implications of a science visual standing alone, if any?  To find the 
answer to this, science must find a comparison with art.  Art often finds its way to a 
prestigious spot in a museum, a historical building, or maybe even the wall of a home.  
It proudly sits still awaiting the moment when a viewer stops to take a glance.  The 
viewer, or visual reader, begins the process of mentally digesting their meaning of the 
piece of work. 
Meaning is a complicated word, especially when associated with all types of 
visuals.  Whether the object under consideration is art, science, or both, visuals might 
have an intended meaning from the creator.  Regardless of this, the responsibility of 
creating that meaning lies with the reader.  As Daston and Galison (1992) explain, 
history shows the transfer of objectivity from the creators of the object to the reader.  
Although scientists attempt to have objective visuals, the determination of how 
objective they are lies within the hands of the user, the individual.  The irony is the 
determination of objectivity is a subjective process, as each individual brings their 
own experience and knowledge to create their own personal meaning. 
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The responsibility to create personal meaning is a powerful trait that all 
humans possess; a responsibility that some argue is one of many defining 
characteristics of art.  As Ede states, “Although artists may make ironic play with 
many images or ideas, I believe they too wish to stimulate audiences to think freely for 
themselves” (Ede, 2002, 67).  Whether artists intended for this independent thinking or 
not is almost irrelevant, as the individual has sole custody over their thoughts, or do 
they? 
In reality, individuals do have control over their constructed meaning, but as 
stated earlier, this meaning includes their own personal experience and knowledge.  If 
the visual has a description written by the creator, and this description is read during 
the viewing process, then the creator has an opportunity to influence the viewer’s 
lasting impression.  Moreover, text or verbal explanations associated with a visual 
enhances a person’s individual knowledge, knowledge that is used for information 
processing. 
Both art and science may have such a description associated with them.  In this 
way, the creator is trying to steer the process of constructing meaning.  The intent of 
the visual must come from the creator, not a secondary source.  Many descriptions of 
historic pieces of art, for example, are written from a second hand account, an expert 
in that particular period of art.  Many creators are no longer alive making it impossible 
to have a first hand account of the intent.  There are many artists today, however, that 
are alive and capable of giving such a description. 
Take for example, Laurie Simmons and her piece of art titled, Purple 
Woman/Kitchen/Second View (Image 4).  A description of the photo on the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art states,  
During the heyday of the feminist movement, however, such toys for girls 
were viewed suspiciously as agents of persuasive indoctrination. Simmons 
nevertheless also understood their complex allure. Located at the intersection 
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between personal and collective memory, these dollhouses represented for an 
entire generation a set of untenable illusions that, while fading, nonetheless 
stubbornly clung to the unconscious. 
Notice that the writing of the description is from a third person point of view, not the 
actual artist’s point of view.  Further, in an interview with Paul Laster from the 
Sperone Westwater museum (2007) in New York City, Simmons states, “Despite the 
kinds of issues — political, feminist, psychological — that have been associated with 
my work, I'd say that light and shadow are the most important things to me. In the end, 
I'm a picture maker, and if the light isn't there, I can't make the picture.”  The focus of 
her work is on light, yet many art critics or historians associate words such as political, 
feminist, and psychological, none of which she endorses in her comments. 
The point is that the description of Laurie Simmons’ piece of work is not 
entirely representative of the intended meaning, or there may very well be multiple 
acceptable interpretations.  Many, not all, science visuals, such as the cone of 
uncertainty, also have written descriptions, which are produced by the source, the 
creators.  Similarly, as has been noted throughout this thesis, there are also multiple 
acceptable interpretations of the cone depending on the individual reader’s 
characteristics, such as their geographic location and their shelter’s condition.  The 
main difference between these two examples is the consequence of a wrong 
interpretation.  I argue that there is no physical consequence to interpreting art 
(scientific, contemporary, cubism or any other) in an incorrect fashion.  If a reader 
looks at Simmons’ piece of art and does not see varying shades of light, then they 
simply create a different meaning.  If someone looks at a satellite picture of a 
hurricane, and does not see a category 3 storm, then they create a different meaning.  
Art, in a traditional sense as well as in a scientific sense, allows for a liberal 
ontological point of view. 
 64
The cone of uncertainty, on the other hand, raises questions about varying 
interpretations, especially those interpretations that are incorrect.   The reason for this 
is that the cone of uncertainty is more than a visual of art, but is also a graphic 
representing risk.  Risk might be the defining feature that makes this graphic so 
different from art, and further distinguishes itself from the rest of science visuals.  
Risk has varying definitions but may include words such as hazard, danger, 
consequence or threat.  When a science visual contains a risk component, the reader’s 
interpretation becomes critically important.  From the creator’s point of view, in this 
case the scientist, they feel an ethical obligation to ensure that the reader understands 
the meaning of the graphic as well as makes an appropriate risk assessment, as the 
extreme consequence of being unable to do both may include death or destruction.  It 
is in this light that risk visuals may revoke their ability to stand alone and 
subsequently, require an explanation. 
The goal of written description or intent is to steer a viewer’s visual 
interpretation.  Many scientists, like the forecasters in this study, have a specific intent 
in mind, which this thesis will explore in the next section.  Visuals have their 
limitations, as Paul Messaris outlines in his book titled, Visual Persuasion.  Messaris 
states, “What visual syntax lacks, especially in comparison to verbal language, is a set 
of explicit devices for indicating causality, analogy, or any relationships other than 
those of space or time” (1997, xvii).  He calls this characteristic of visuals syntactic 
indeterminacy.  Knowing that visuals have limitations to their persuasive character, 
written descriptions must make up for this missing characteristic.   
 In a way, the cone of uncertainty is trying to persuade people in the impact 
area that there is a pending risk in the immediate future.  Knowing this, and combining 
the concept of syntactic indeterminacy, expands the argument that visuals containing 
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risks require explanation.  This argument also matches the forecasters’ sentiments.  
One broadcaster said:  
The graphic by itself doesn’t do much of anything… So what I have done for 
years and years, and I think it’s the only way to do it, is that you have to talk 
about scenarios in the cone, and say lets lay out the possibilities, because all 
the cone is telling us here is that its likely that the center of the storm will stay 
within this boundary. 
The opening line describes the theoretical issues with risk visuals, what do risk visuals 
do by themselves?  Unless the reader has enough prior experience or knowledge with 
the graphic to know what it means, the description is vital.  Even more, hurricanes are 
like fingerprints; no two hurricanes are the same.  Thus, every cone of uncertainty 
expresses a unique, independent risk. 
 Another government forecaster expressed, “You need the [skinny, black] line 
… to convey with the uncertainty on either side and the cone is the best way of 
representing that …. So we need to do a better job of communicating that during the 
event.”  This forecaster emphasizes the importance of the visual conveying something 
as abstract as scientific uncertainty, but recognizes that such abstraction needs 
explanation. 
 The forecasters show the need for visuals, but also the value of explanation.  
The requirement of explanation is not present to create jobs for broadcast 
meteorologists.  On the contrary, explanation is present to ensure that people 
understand what the visual is conveying and providing them with the tools to make an 
accurate risk assessment.  The necessity of the reader understanding the creator’s 
intent is what I call high visual validity.   
 
Defining Visual Validity 
Visual validity is an analytical construct to describe how accurately a reader’s 
meaning of a visual matches that of the creator’s intent.  In other words, it is the 
 66
process of visual meaning or intent translating into an individual’s meaning.   In the 
case of the cone of uncertainty, high visual validity is necessary to prevent costly and 
potentially deadly misinterpretations for those in the likely impacted area.  The reader 
must understand the creator’s intent if the reader plans to use the graphic to make an 
evacuation or other storm related decision.  On the other hand, for Laurie Simmons, 
low visual validity is necessary, as the creator does not have one, specific intent for the 
audience to comprehend.   
As the forecasters demonstrate through their comments, not all visuals are 
capable of communicating a message without a verbal or written description.  Even 
more, when there is a risk or consequence involved in a misinterpretation, it is 
imperative that the reader take away the essence of the message, requiring both visual 
and verbal explanations.  Therein lies another potential characteristic of risk visuals; 
risk visuals require high visual validity.  This appears to be the case not only because 
the creator wants the public to take away the intent, but also because there is a 
consequence involved if they do not. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter makes one small step to define and explore visual validity.  It is a 
concept worthy of more research, especially as it pertains to risk visuals.  The cone of 
uncertainty indicates that risk visuals may require verbal or written explanation to 
attain high visual validity.  What also needs more attention is what this verbal or 
written explanation entails.  The next chapter will take a closer look at the written and 





EXPLORING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN A VISUAL AND ITS OBJECTIVES 
 
Overview 
To begin to unravel the relationships between visual and verbal messages, it is 
important to assess each individual piece.  The first question focuses on how many 
different verbal or written messages exist.  Based on the meteorologists emphasizing 
the need for a consistent message, one would imagine that the verbal message is the 
same, but as this thesis has already shown, visuals, in contrast, move through many 
institutional design changes.  Do verbal or written messages have different objectives 
as well?  If so, how do people interpret these objectives?  How does this affect their 
risk assessment?  Does the public actually hear multiple messages? Or, do they trust 
one media source over the other?  This chapter will begin to answer whether the verbal 
or written messages have different objectives among the varying institutions. 
Second, because the cone of uncertainty as well as other potential risk visuals, 
focuses on an impact, there is often a desire to prompt a behavioral response to the 
message.   Do meteorologists have a specific behavioral message?  If so, how does this 
behavioral message relate to the visual?  Is the behavioral message the same as the 
verbal or written messages from the previous paragraph?  Protection motivation theory 
suggests that when people perceive a threat, they are more likely to protect themselves 
if they are aware of the steps they can take.  Further, they will feel a higher level of 
self-efficacy if they believe they have the ability to take these steps (Rogers, 1975).  
Protection motivation theory suggests, then, that one of the messages discussed above 
will be a behavioral response.   To look at this, this chapter will concentrate on 
forecasters’ opinions of the potential behavioral responses from the cone of 
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uncertainty and explore the potential relationship between these responses and the 
graphic. 
Overall, this chapter will:  
• Identify the message intent of the cone of uncertainty, and 
• Identify the intended behavioral responses to the cone of uncertainty. 
The relationship between a visual and its associated message or behavioral objective 
will be explored in the discussion section in Chapter 8.  The quotes used in this 
chapter fall under the code ‘message objective’ and ‘behavioral response to the 
graphic.’  This message objective code, however, became too larger and was broken 
down into emphasis on uncertainty, confidence/certainty, and risk/impacts. 
 
Multiple Meanings and Messages: The Objective of the Cone of Uncertainty 
Although meteorologists emphasize the need for a consistent message, it 
appears that implementing consistency is much more difficult.  Just as there are many 
variations on the cone of uncertainty, there are also many verbal or written messages 
associated with this graphic.  There are also three distinct categories of looking at 
message objectives: (1) what does the graphic mean; (2) what are the specific 
objectives of looking at the graphic; and (3) what is the objective of those objectives, 
i.e., to understand or to take action, etc.  Simply from the varying levels of what an 
objective is sheds light on the question about verbal or written messages having 
multiple meanings. 
The first objective that appeared in the data was a clear definition of what the 
graphic means.  Not surprisingly, the responses relate to the specific design of the 
graphic not in an artistic sense, but in a scientific one.  One forecaster explained,  
The cone as you know is made up by connecting a series of circles drawn 
around the forecast points at various time periods and for many years the size 
of the circles had been determined by looking at average errors of a previous 
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ten year period.  Beginning this year we’ve changed the way the size of the 
circles is computed and it’s no longer the mean of the ten year error, but it is 
the 67th percentile of the five year error. 
If the cone of uncertainty appeared in the AMS’s Glossary of Meteorology, which it 
does not, this is the type of definition that would appear.  This response fits as a 
dictionary definition of the cone of uncertainty.  To further define it, another forecaster 
stated, “So in other words, if you take say the 72-hour point and you draw the circle 
and it comes out to the width of the cone, by taking the 67th percentile of the area that 
means that 2/3 of the time the actual position [of the hurricane] would be within that 
circle.”  Even further, another forecaster finished the definition by adding, “But, the 
bad news is that means like 1/3 of the time it’s going to be outside of the cone.” 
 It is not surprising that meteorologists give an initial scientific description of 
the cone of uncertainty.  Research shows, for example, that there are differences 
between expert and lay judgments regarding risk.  Some researchers suggest that 
scientists think about risk quantitatively whereas laypeople think about risks more 
qualitatively.  Scientists tend to associate risk with probability, whereas the public 
tends to think more about previous experiences, or past impacts (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Slovic, 1999).   As the graphic expresses a risk or hazard, it is fitting 
that scientists would follow this suggested model.  It took more probing to gather a 
deeper response from the interviewees as to what the public’s objective or take away 
message should be.  One interviewee, however, refused to give a deeper response 
suggesting that the graphic has a title in policy, meaning that any NHC or NWS 
graphic has a policy, a documented description, of what the graphic means.  The title, 
or meaning, for the cone of uncertainty is the “Tropical cyclone Track and Watch 
Warning Graphic.”  Indeed, the graphic does show the track of the cyclone and its 
associated hurricane watch and warnings, but to quote one interviewee, “But, again, I 
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would say, what does that cone mean? So what? How is that going to impact me or 
you?”  That question is what the next subsection of message objectives will explore.  
The interviewees’ comments converged into three main categories for the 
specific message objective, uncertainty, impacts (risks), and confidence.  It is worth 
stating that all three of these message objectives have a relationship with the track, or 
path, of the hurricane.  Many interviewees when prompted for an objective mentioned 
things like, “Where it’s going to go,” or “the area of possible impact.”  Both of these 
responses have associations with the track of the hurricane, but the real message 
objective is in the details of the responses focusing on whether the interviewees 
emphasize, scientific uncertainty, impacts (risks), or confidence.  
A closer look at the responses shows that emphasizing uncertainty of the storm 
track is one of the most important factors to communicate.  In response to the 
question, “what is the objective of the graphic,” here are some of the answers:  
Example 1: Bottom line the answer to your question is whether we’ll be able to 
give the public an idea of the uncertainty to provide the real detailed 
information, well how to use it to decision makers at the local and state level to 
help them with their tough calls. 
 
Example 2: We have to convey that there’s a level of uncertainty with this 
track prediction 
 
Example 3: We will never be able to predict a perfect forecast, so somehow we 
have to convey that uncertainty in the forecast.  
 
Example 4: I try to convey the uncertainty and the possible areas of risk.  
It is quite apparent that uncertainty is a key objective of the visual message.  The 
visual, through the white cone surrounding the black line, tries to convey the 
uncertainty that these meteorologists are referring to, but even more, they suggest that 
the verbal message must emphasize this message as well. 
 The concept of uncertainty is related to a previous section on using 
probabilities when communicating a weather forecast.  In the case of hurricane tracks, 
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numbers or probabilities are not associated with specific locations in the cone, but the 
white cone is still suggesting that there is uncertainty, or variability as to where that 
track might travel.  The center of the hurricane will eventually only hit one area of the 
coastline.  The problem, however, is that when the hurricane is 3-7 days offshore, 
there is no way to predict exactly where that hurricane will hit.  As one forecaster 
stated,  
We’re working to get more certainty in there [in the forecast], but we still have 
to convey the level of uncertainty we have today when we make a forecast, and 
if that covers too large of an area for people’s liking, then, you know, we [the 
weather community] will just keep on supporting our research. 
 The amount of uncertainty in hurricane forecasting is indeed a reason to fund 
future hurricane research, but potentially of more interest is how to communicate the 
current day uncertainty.  Mistaking the “skinny black line” as the exact hit location 
could result in an unprepared community, such as the Port Charlotte, FL area during 
Hurricane Charley.  If this community understood the uncertainty of the track, it is 
possible they would have made better decisions.  From this, it is easy to understand 
why uncertainty is highly emphasized as an objective of the cone of uncertainty. 
 The second most emphasized objective includes the impacts or risks of the 
hurricane as related to the track of the hurricane.  The difficulty in communicating 
impacts is that there are many types, and their start time, and even forecast ability 
time, differs.  For example, when the hurricane is out in the ocean, well beyond the 
shore, the only impact information that forecasters feel comfortable discussing is wind 
intensity.  One government forecaster stated, “We forecast track. We forecast intensity 
and we forecast size.”  As soon as the hurricane path is closer to the shore, forecasters 
feel more comfortable talking about a wider array of impacts, but that responsibility 
also shifts from the NHC to the NWS local offices.  For example,  
Okay, so how we interpret those threats, those hazards? How do we 
incorporate uncertainty? That’s where the cone of uncertainty doesn’t have 
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much anymore. It’s not good enough, okay. In a sense, what we try to do is 
take the forecast they provide for us, which is the, the larger forecast and we 
sort of try to downscale it for the local user. We pay special attention to every 
one of those hazards. 
The hazards that they are referring to include coastal flooding, or storm surge, inland 
flooding, wave height, tornadoes, etc.  Even further, one private sector forecaster 
stated that hazards also include, 
Rainfall impacts, power outage graphics. The rainfall graphics show likelihood 
of flooding: low, medium, extremely high, catastrophic flooding possible. 
Then we have power outage impact: possible, likely, certain, guaranteed, 
you’re going to get power outages here, be prepared for it within the next 24 
hours. So those other graphics have developed and they run through my 
numerical models and then I draw the pictures from them. 
But, one might be asking, what do these impacts have to do with the message 
associated with the cone of uncertainty?  If everyone is making different graphics for 
impacts, then how are these impacts included in the message?  
 The cone of uncertainty shows the potential track and uncertainty of the 
hurricane, which plays a vital role in communicating where the impacts of a hurricane 
are heading.  One forecaster explained, “You want to convey some type of impact, and 
the center is, I mean, for maybe a hurricane it is certainly good to know where the 
center is going to be and where it is most likely going to be.”  Specifically, one 
forecaster suggested, “If you were close enough to that track … then know you should 
expect damage within 50 miles of landfall.”  Thus, the location of the center and the 
potential track of the hurricane are not communicating a specific risk or impact, but 
rather the interviewees are suggesting specific locations that are most likely to feel the 
worst impacts of the storm.  The potential impacts, then, are the reason why an 
audience pays attention to the uncertainty of the track.   
 In many ways, then, forecasters need to combine the objectives of uncertainty 
of the track with its associated impacts.  Indeed, some meteorologists did identify both 
 73
as objectives.  Reviewing example 1 and 4 from above, both of these quotes imply that 
uncertainty and impacts are important objectives.  Take example 1,    
Bottom line the answer to your question is whether we’ll be able to give the 
public an idea of the uncertainty to provide the real detailed information, well 
how to use it to decision makers at the local and state level to help them with 
their tough calls. 
The forecaster is implying that he wants their detailed information used in tough calls 
referencing more than simply the track.  Just the track is not enough to make 
evacuation decisions for decision makers.  It is the associated risks, the “detailed 
information,” of this track that leads to behavioral actions.  Further, the forecaster’s 
statement in example four specifically mentions both objectives stating, “I try to 
convey the uncertainty and the possible areas of risk.”  This association may lead 
meteorologists to make sure that NWS issued watches and warnings are on the cone of 
uncertainty.  Looking closely at Images 1 and 3, one can see that the watches and 
warnings are color coded on the NHC graphic. Private sector companies respond 
similarly showing the NWS watches and warnings on their graphics as well.4 
 At this point, the cone of uncertainty has two message objectives that of 
scientific uncertainty and potential impacts.  Additionally, the relationship between 
these two objectives is clear, the uncertainty of the track relates to the uncertainty of 
where the potential impacts are heading.  The third objective, though not as prominent 
as the first two, indicates a desire to differentiate each storm.  The third objective is 
characterized best by one forecaster’s response to what is the most popular question 
that emergency managers ask.  His response was, “the most common question is how 
confident are you in the forecast.” 
 Confidence, not to be confused with certainty, characterizes the meteorologists 
desire to show their “sureness” about their forecast.  For example, one meteorologist 
                                                 
4 I do not have examples of private sector graphics showing the watches and warnings.   Private sector 
graphics are not archived on the web, which makes accessing such graphics very difficult. 
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stated, “So you need to know, figure out how to forecast the uncertainty to sort of 
calibrate it so we can be statistically sure that when we say something is high 
certainty, that we are right.”  First, the use of the word “certainty” does not mean the 
opposite of uncertainty, but rather it means how confident they are in a forecast.  A 
forecaster may have a higher confidence in the track for a specific hurricane, but the 
uncertainty of the track, the cone, remains a prominent part of the discussion.  They 
could also be more confident about the intensity of the storm, but still be uncertain 
about the track.  For example,  
If they decide to ignore the forecast, they're saying there's too much 
uncertainty. ‘Look, these guys got a big cone out there or they're flipping 
around. I ain't making a decision today’, but if we come back at day three and 
four and say hey, this thing is a Cat 5. We think it's going to be a Cat 3 or 4 
when it makes landfall. We're pretty certain about that. It's going to be 
anywhere between New Orleans and northeastern Florida. We're pretty certain. 
Here, the forecaster provided an example of when he feels more confident regarding 
the wind intensity calling it a category 3 or 4.  Their landfall location, however, still 
includes a wide geographic area concluding that the track is still uncertain.   
 Having high confidence of a storm’s forecast is a desired characteristic, as it 
allows forecasters to start discussing the potential impacts.  One private sector 
forecaster stated, “When it gets closer in, where you’re thoroughly confident where 
it’s going, that’s when you can start talking about the impacts.”  Further, a broadcast 
meteorologist stated, “As the hurricane is coming toward the coast, a risk area goes up 
on the coast, and if it’s especially certain things at some point a high risk area goes up 
on the coast, prior to a warning or a watch.”  Confidence is a tool, or even a desired 
state of knowledge, to indicate when it is appropriate to communicate particular 
impacts.     
 Even more, confidence is so highly valued that some forecasters would like to 
see it incorporated into the graphic.  A couple forecasters suggested that the addition 
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of a confidence scale to the cone of uncertainty could potentially be helpful in 
communicating risks.  One interviewee suggested using the Hydrological Prediction 
Center’s process for incorporating confidence, which includes writing in their advisory 
whether their confidence is below average, average, above average, or well above 
average.  Additionally, one forecaster asked about changing the size of the cone based 
on confidence: 
There is a lot of confusion about what the air cone truly means.  I know 
because I used the information, .. the cone itself, the size is independent of 
current environmental conditions and I remember a long time ago asking if a 
weighting factor could be applied to the cone such that based on the confidence 
level that the forecaster had, that the cone could either be increased in size or 
decreased. 
Currently, the science is not there yet, but one forecaster leads us to believe that it is 
not that far away.  In response to changing the size of the cone, he said,  
We don’t, because A, we’re not confident in it and B, because we haven’t 
gotten to the point of doing scenario specific cones. We’re working that way, 
but I would doubt that we would always…well we certainly might change the 
size depending on the confidence.  There are other situations where we feel 
confident about something and we would narrow [the cone] if we could. 
Nevertheless, the cone has a standard definition of which confidence is not included.  
As some forecasters suggest, confidence is most appropriately included in a written or 
verbal message, but it is not entirely appropriate for the graphic.     
 Uncertainty, impacts and confidence emerged as the three most pressing 
message objectives regarding the cone of uncertainty.  Figure 4 on the following page 
summarizes how these objectives add to the cone of uncertainty’s complicated life.  
Despite knowing this, what is the greater objective to people knowing this 
information?  This thesis identifies the cone of uncertainty as both a science and risk 
visual implying the need for an audience to understand the science, assess their risk, 
and take some action.  Although these implications seem clear, the forecasters stress 
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understanding of the science and general awareness of the risks before taking any 
action from their message. 
 For example, a government meteorologist in response to what is the message 
objective stated, “Realize that anywhere in that cone of uncertainty you can have a 
hurricane breathing down your neck.”  The forecaster does not suggest any action, but 
emphasizes being aware that there is a hurricane coming.   
 Another example emphasizes the understanding of what the graphic is 
showing, the forecaster stated, “Take away message? Well, the first thing I think I 
would want them to know is if they’re in a watch or warning.  The second thing I 
would like them to know is, are they in the area of possible impact.”  Again, this 
statement emphasizes having the person be aware of their risks, but does not suggest 
any action. 
 
Figure 4. The visual process of the cone of uncertainty with its associated verbal 
or written description. 
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 Furthermore, another meteorologist wanted people to take away that:  
This is where we strongly feel in this area, that this is where the hurricane is 
going to go. In the article, we would write the factors, high pressure here, 
upper low here. It’s driving it in this general direction you know. Here’s where 
we think it’s going to go at what particular time. And of course you know that, 
you obviously know the farther out you go the wider the uncertainty gets. 
This response emphasizes the state of the science and understanding the uncertainties 
involved.  Unlike the other two examples, this objective does not stress the importance 
of assessing risk.   
  Although the implications of behavior seem inherent in the graphic, some 
forecasters deem it otherwise.  In fact, one government meteorologist stated, “There’s 
very little actionable information that someone can and should be taking away from 
this graphic.”  It is important to note that this section focuses on forecasters’ responses 
to the cone of uncertainty’s message objective.  The next section will concentrate on 
the responses given regarding the potential behavioral response to the graphic in hopes 
to examine the above statement’s inaccuracy.   
 
Do Visuals and Their Verbal or Written Messages Have a Behavioral Response?  
 As stated in the previous section, the meteorologists included in this study do 
not identify prompting behavior as a main message objective.  There are four potential 
explanations for this: (1) the need for scientific objectivity, (2) liability concerns, (3) 
complacency, and (4) the role of emergency managers.  First, scientists like to 
maintain objectivity when giving a forecast.  Introducing a behavioral concept may 
show signs of subjectivity violating their scientific standards.  When dealing with a 
large audience, it is difficult to associate one behavioral response for the entire 
viewing audience.  A private sector forecaster stated, “We never tell somebody to 
evacuate. ‘Hey, you in New Orleans?!  Get out of there! You need to evacuate!’ What 
I say is this, ‘this is going to be a close call.  You’re going to be missed by the worst 
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part of it.’”  Focusing their statement to suggest that the public will miss the worst part 
of it leaves the decision to evacuate in the viewer’s hands.  It allows the scientist to 
remain objective and transfers any subjective response to the individual.     
 Second, there is a liability factor in providing a behavioral response. A private 
sector forecaster confirmed this concern: 
The tropical storm force winds are going to overtake you by 6 o’clock. This is 
the latest information that we have, and the storm surge is going to start to cut 
off the bridge by midnight tonight. You have to be careful as a broadcaster by 
telling people what to do because there are liability issues and stuff like that. 
This forecaster indicates that fine line between giving potential real-time impacts with 
associated behavior.  Informing the public that the storm surge will “cut off the bridge 
by midnight” is a clear indication that one should not travel on that bridge.  There is an 
implication of a behavioral message, but the forecaster never states it due to liability 
concerns. 
 Third, meteorologists feel that there is a high level of public complacency 
concerning hurricane threats.  As one government meteorologist suggested: 
I think we’re doing just about everything we can.  I know the emergency 
managers up in the Northeast and in NY are beating the drums constantly, but I 
fear that it’s falling on deaf ears up there.  We haven’t had one since 1938.  
That’s 60 years ago, 50, 60 years ago, what’s the problem? 70 years now, so, 
there’s a lot of complacency in there, and unfortunately sometimes it takes a 
hurricane to wake them up. 
This apparent complacency with the public is also influencing how the forecasters feel 
about communicating behavioral actions.  For example, in the case of Hurricane 
Charley, one meteorologist questioned “whether [an] evacuation would have made any 
difference [for the Port Charlotte area], because there’s a lot of people who won’t 
leave their homes no matter what you tell them.”  The influence of the public’s 
complacency on forecasters may preclude them from thinking about communicating 
behavioral actions. 
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 Lastly, and more importantly, meteorologists believe that the responsibility of 
communicating actions lies with the emergency managers.  Recall a quote used in a 
previous section that shows this distinction in responsibilities.  It stated, “We produce 
the meteorology, the impacts, you know, expected impacts on the infrastructure and on 
people's lives. It's something we can communicate, but they have responsibility for 
protecting, okay, when push comes to shove.”  This government meteorologist divides 
the responsibilities into two categories: (1) communicating the impacts, which is the 
responsibility of the weather community, and (2) communicating how to protect the 
people, which is the responsibility of the emergency management community.  
 Further, when asked if people should take specific action when looking at the 
graphic, another government meteorologist responded with, “Absolutely not.  I want 
them to listen to their local decision makers.”  Again, the forecaster presents what 
looks like a clear division between communicating impacts compared to 
communicating actions.  What is perhaps more interesting, however, is that prompting 
someone to “listen to their emergency managers” is an action.  It requires a person to 
continue watching the TV, to look up their emergency manager’s website, or perhaps 
to read evacuation orders in a newspaper, all of which require action.  The 
meteorologists in this study appear to have a limited view of what action or behavioral 
messages entail.   
In fact, as the rest of this section will show, there are a myriad of behavioral 
actions that meteorologists want to prompt.   The major difference among these 
actions is when to communicate them.  Hurricanes are a moving risk.  Unlike cancer, 
vague terrorism threats, or soil contaminants, forecasters and the public alike have the 
ability to watch the risk, the hurricane, move closer to or away from the United States.  
Because it is a traveling risk, there are unique actions associated with the amount of 
time (t), that the risk is away from landfall.  For example, emergency managers on 
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average issue evacuation orders 48 hours before landfall, perhaps as early as 72 hours 
for extremely vulnerable cities such as New Orleans.  The strongly suggested 
behavioral action at time equals 48 hours before landfall (Bt=B48) is to act on the 
evacuation orders.  The concern is meteorologists are communicating the threat and 
potential impacts as soon as the hurricane forms, which could be more than a week a 
way from landfall, if it ever makes landfall.  If meteorologists are truly transferring all 
behavioral responsibility to the emergency managers, as they state they are, then how 
do meteorologists explain, if at all, the actionable responses that people may take at 
these different times? 
 After coding the interviews, there are five distinct time frames that have 
actions associated with them.  In sequential order, they are the beginning of hurricane 
season (June 1st), the formation of a hurricane, the 5-day cone, the 3-day cone, and the 
48 hours before landfall.  As the beginning of hurricane season approaches, public 
officials, emergency managers, and meteorologists stress the importance of 
preparedness.  As one forecaster outlined, “You have to get down to the individual 
level.  Absolutely.  And that’s why I always like to say that every individual, every 
family, every person in the community should have a hurricane plan in place before 
the hurricane season even starts.”  Another forecaster resonated with these sentiments 
and further explained, 
For any given point from the Yukatan to the Carolinas, the chances that they’re 
going to get hit is very small. So what sort of thing should you make to sort of 
… the only thing you should make sure, which is what I think is the most 
obvious course of action for anybody, is to say, well, I have to make sure I 
have all the cards in place, that I know where I live, that I know when 
something is a watch or warning. Do I live in an operation zone? Is my home 
properly prepared? If I have all the instruments, all the tools to prepare my 
home come the time that I need to take action. Life goes on, you know. 
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The main message as June 1st nears is to prepare the individual, their family and their 
belongings for the chance of a land falling hurricane in their area.  This is the 
actionable item communicated at the beginning of hurricane season.  
 Disappointedly true, though, most people are not prepared as hurricane season 
begins.  The Hurricane Survival Initiative, a public private partnership that surveys the 
public regarding hurricane preparedness, states that for the hurricane season of 2007, 
52% did not have a family plan, and 61% did not have a hurricane survival kit, which 
includes items such as, first aid materials, flashlights and batteries, and most 
importantly, enough food and water per person for at least 3 days (National Hurricane 
Survival Initiative, 2007).  It is not surprising, then, that meteorologists include 
preparing hurricane kits in their message once it is known that a hurricane is going to 
threaten land.   
 Before a hurricane hits land, however, the hurricane must form in the Gulf of 
Mexico or somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean.  This is not necessarily the time to 
induce fear as the hurricane may or may not become a threat to the United States.  As 
one private sector forecaster remarked: 
If it’s out in the Atlantic Ocean, the first thing we try to do is tell people “is 
this going to be a threat to the United States or not?” or, “we can’t tell yet”. So 
the first thing is, we need to stand by if it’s a long way out, we can’t tell yet, or 
just from what it’s not a guarantee yet. But it looks like this is going to turn to 
the North and not become a threat to the US, but keep watching just in case. 
Don’t turn your back on it yet. We never tell them to turn their back 
completely ‘cause if you’re wrong and they turn off the TV for 5 days they’re 
doomed. 
As this forecaster outlines, this is not the time to frighten people about the threat, but it 
is the time to increase awareness that there is a risk out there.  Furthermore, the 
actionable item at the hurricane formation stage is to “keep watching.”  As the 
forecaster observes, there is another risk to turning off your TV for the next few days.  
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Being unaware about a potential risk does not allow you to take any preparedness 
actions.   
 Once the hurricane reaches a distance comparable to five days away, this is 
where most meteorologists have a distinct message.  As one meteorologist stated: 
If you didn’t do the preparations at the beginning of the hurricane season like 
you were encouraged to do, which most people unfortunately don’t, then that’s 
your opportunity to reevaluate the stock of your own personal preparedness 
and take advantage of that as being your 5 day window to take care of those 
things you should’ve already done. 
The 5-day window is denoted by an extended cone with dashed lines, as used by the 
NHC, or by different color shadings, as with the private sector.  The forecast 
uncertainty for day 4 and 5 is much higher than that of days 1-3.  Thus, the action to 
take and to communicate at this moment is to start or finish making your hurricane 
preparedness kit.  
 Furthermore, many meteorologists emphasized the action of listening to 
emergency managers stating, “They better listen to their emergency managers,” “I 
want them to listen to their emergency managers,” or, “Take actions according to what 
the emergency managers tell them to do or recommend them to do.”  This was a major 
theme from most of the interviews.  Emergency managers typically issue evacuation 
orders 48 hours before an area begins to feel hurricane impacts.  Decision makers do 
not want individuals driving through evacuation routes while beginning to feel the 
impacts from a hurricane.  Because of this, meteorologists identify the 5-day cone as a 
good indicator to start listening to emergency manager orders.   
 Once an individual is in the 3-day cone, the threat of feeling impacts from a 
hurricane drastically increases.  As one forecaster explained, “If I’m in that [5-day] 
cone, I’ve got to keep monitoring the situation and see where it is [heading].  If I’m in 
that 3-day area, heck, I need to try and make my hurricane plans.”  This forecaster, 
again, stresses the importance of monitoring the storm, but even further, when an 
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individual is in that 3-day cone, one should begin to implement their plan in 
accordance with the emergency management message. 
 The 3-day cone shows that the center of the hurricane is three days away.  
Depending on which variation of the cone one looks at, it may or may not be clear that 
the individual my feel the impacts from the hurricane, due to its size, earlier than those 
three days.  To help communicate this threat, the NHC in coordination with the NWS, 
issues tropical storm and hurricane watches and warnings.  The NHC issues a tropical 
storm watch when, “tropical storm conditions, including winds from 39 to 73 miles 
per hour (mph), pose a possible threat to a specified coastal area within 36 hours.”  
They issue a tropical storm warning when “tropical storm conditions, including winds 
from 39 to 73 mph, are expected in a specified coastal area within 24 hours or less.”  
Figure 5. The visual process of the cone of uncertainty with its associated 
verbal or written description as well as its associated behavioral actions at 
time, t. 
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The same time frames apply to hurricane watches and warnings, but the winds must 
reach a sustained level of over 74 mph (NOAA, 2008).  Meteorologists also identified 
the watches and warnings of the 3-day cone, as action inducing characteristics.  
 For example, one forecaster explained: 
Once the watch goes up, then you’re going to have to start putting that plan 
into action.  And especially true is that when that warning is issued then that’s 
it.  You either stay or you go depending on what your plan is, and then you do 
it.  Simple as that.  Get that hurricane plan in place. 
Another forecaster described the meaning of a warning explaining, “When you see 
‘hurricane warning,’ that’s not a forecast. That’s a headline.  That’s there to invoke an 
action.”  Bottom line, meteorologists use tropical storm and hurricane watches and 
warnings to evoke action, whether its stay tuned, listen to emergency managers, or get 
“out of Dodge.” 
 Despite many of the meteorologists suggesting that the cone of uncertainty 
does not have behavioral actions associated with it, this section shows that their 
statements could not be farther from the truth.  Although meteorologists do not give 
individual orders to evacuate, they do promote numerous behavioral actions such as 
listening to emergency managers, developing hurricane preparedness plans, and 
staying tuned to hazard updates.  Figure 5 on the previous page summarizes the 
addition of the behavioral message to the life of the cone of uncertainty.  
Meteorologists need to be more aware of the role they play in communicating these 
behavioral messages, as it is these messages that may increase an individual’s self-
efficacy, that is, their willingness to believe they have the ability to respond to the 




Are Both the Message Objectives and Behavioral Actions Objectives, and If So, How 
Do They Relate To the Visual? 
The initial response to the question, “Do you want people to take any action 
from this graphic,” sparked a flurry of reactions from “absolutely not” to “there’s very 
little actionable information that someone can and should be taking away from this 
graphic.”  As the previous section shows, though, behavioral actions typically follow 
from these sharp reactions.  One private sector forecaster demonstrated this 
dissonance.  First, in response to action from the graphic, this meteorologist stated, 
“Based solely on the graphic, I would say no.”  He followed with this:  
I would say you definitely need to start doing your own research, read the 
article [written forecast], because the graphic is just a supplement to the article.  
We emphasize that you go back and read the warnings.  You go to a separate 
link on the application that has where we display the hurricane warnings and 
hurricane local statements. 
By the use of phrases such as, “start doing,” “read,” or “go to,” the forecaster implies 
that there are behavioral responses to the graphic.  What is possibly more important is 
what this forecaster offered just moments after: 
People are going to take action.  It’s a perfectly human natural reaction to see 
that your area is in this cone and you know, or is highlighted based off the 
cone. Being targeted by a hurricane you feel that you need to do something. 
There’s no doubt about it that that’s a perfectly natural thing. Then comes 
along educating what to do when you reach that point of, I need to do 
something, you know, and that’s where the article comes in. Go to your 
weather link and read the local hurricane statement. Then basically educate 
them that there is now a decision making process that they have to make and 
making sure that they are referred to the right direction and the right group of 
people and help them make the right decisions they need to make in order to 
save their property, their lives and so on. 
This particular statement is the closest assessment to the truth.  People will take action.   
Despite the fact that meteorologists do not identify a behavioral response as a 
message objective, it appears that through all of their responses, behavior does play a 
crucial role.  Further, as protection motivation theory describes, people’s initial 
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reaction to the graphic will include assessing their risk or perceiving a threat and 
wanting to take some action to alleviate this threat (Neuwirth, Dunwoody & Griffin, 
2000).  The combination of these two statements suggests that the behavioral message 
might potentially be more important than any other message objective initially 
identified by the meteorologists, which leads me to ask, what is the desired impact of 
the graphic and its associated message?  Is it more important for individuals to 
understand the science of the cone of uncertainty, or, is it more vital for individuals to 
respond appropriately?  What is the ultimate goal? 
 After reviewing all the interviews, it appears that meteorologists want both.  
One government meteorologist explained, “Ultimately, we want people to take 
action.”  This is true, but in order for people to take that action they must first 
accurately understand the general science and assess their risk.  There is a relationship 
from the forecaster point of view, then, between the visual and its associated written or 
verbal message as well as with its associated behavioral message.  First, the written or 
verbal message may help the individual focus on specific aspects of the graphic in turn 
helping them assess their risk.  Second, depending on where the individual’s location 
falls on the cone of uncertainty, that location at time, t, has a specific behavioral 
message associated with it.  Figure 6 (See Appendix C) tries to outline all the potential 
message and behavioral components of the cone of uncertainty, as stated by the 
meteorologists in this study.   
 
Summary 
 This chapter identified three main message objectives for the cone of 
uncertainty including scientific uncertainty, risks or impacts, and confidence.  
Furthermore, this chapter showed how there are distinct behavioral intents at different 
times associated with the graphic.  Although meteorologists are hesitant to 
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communicate behavioral actions, their responses show that behavioral messages are 
just as important as communicating scientific uncertainty and impacts.  The next 
chapter will define visual framing, and compare some of these objectives to the design 
of the cone of uncertainty. 







Now that the messages of the cone of uncertainty are clear, the last step is to 
compare the relationship between these message and behavioral objectives and the 
design of the visual.  Much of visual literacy is a subjective process, as outlined in 
Chapter 5.  There is, however, an entire body of literature that suggests, for example, 
that the design of visuals should follow a certain process (Tufte, 1986), and that there 
is a relationship between visuals and their associated message (Braden, 1994; Lang, 
1995; Mayer, 2001).  How well or not well does the cone of uncertainty match its 
messages?  How does this (mis)matching impact the public’s understanding or 
perception of the risk? What does this mean for other risk visuals with associated 
messages?  The chapter will explore whether the messages and behavioral intent of the 
cone of uncertainty do indeed match their associated visuals.  This chapter will also 
define visual framing. 
It is worth noting that this chapter will not make a theoretical comparison 
between framing of verbal or written messages as compared to visual framing.  The 
meaning of framing has a long and debated history in communication that goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis (Scheufele, 2000).  This thesis will only develop the 
idea of visual framing, but future research should focus on the direct comparison 
between both types of framing.   
The quotes used in this chapter fall under the visual framing code, which I 
developed during the second phase of coding.  
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Defining Visual Framing 
 Visual framing, although a new concept for scientific or risk visual design, 
stems from many developed areas of literature.  From visual displays (Tufte, 1986) to 
cognitive theories of multimedia learning (Mayer, 2001) to the effectiveness of visuals 
on TV (Lang, 1995; Zhou, 2005), the foundation for visual framing exists.  This new 
concept, however, must pull together all of these literatures to become a viable 
concept that will potentially influence the creation of risk visuals, such as the cone of 
uncertainty. 
 Researchers studying the effects of visuals in TV news use the term “channel 
semantic relatedness” or redundancy.  These terms capture the idea that both visual 
and verbal channels presented in TV news need to have a certain level of relatedness.  
Summarizing the works of Lang (1995) and Reese (1984), Zhou states, “Most 
researchers defined redundancy as shared information between the audio and visual 
channels, such that they are facilitative and not contradictory relationships between 
words and pictures” (2005, 25).  For example, if the audio refers to science budget 
cuts, a picture of lawmakers is more effective than a picture of scientists in the lab, as 
the emphasis is on lawmakers cutting the science budget not on laboratory scientists. 
 Mayer’s work may explain why that is and offer the foundation for visual 
framing.  First, when using both verbal and visual information to communicate a 
message, a person must process both types of information simultaneously, but as 
researchers show there are separate channels for verbal versus visual processing 
(Paivio,1986) .  Further, there is a limit to how much information each channel can 
process simultaneously (Baddeley, 1992; Chandler & Sweller, 1991).  Lastly, as 
suggested earlier, individuals will use their prior knowledge and combine it with the 
newly processed visual and verbal data (Mayer, 1999).   
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 Using this information, Mayer suggests that there is a process of integration 
between the separately processed visual and verbal information.  He states,  
It involves building connections between corresponding portions of the 
pictorial and verbal models as well as relevant existing knowledge from long-
term memory.  This process occurs in visual and verbal working memory and 
involves the coordination between them. 
Thus, for the cone of uncertainty, individuals must first separately process the visual 
and the verbal or written message, and then integrate that information to form an 
understanding of the material.  Mayer continues to look at this phenomenon by 
focusing his attention on presentation space between visuals and written messages or 
the timing of presentation.  Although Mayer does suggest that extraneous words on 
visual drawings may inhibit learning, to date, Mayer has not looked at visual design 
features such as how well the visual design corresponds to the verbal message to 
increase learning.    
 Mayer’s work provides the foundational literature to suggest that maximum 
learning occurs when visuals and verbal messages correspond, so as to make the 
‘integration process’ as effortless as possible.  Tufte’s (1986) work, on the other hand, 
focuses on the details of graphical data such as, how to present the data, the use of 
colors to express quantitative information, or the idea of erasing unnecessary ink.  
Although Tufte’s work has direct applications and suggestions for the visual in this 
case study, his work does not consider nor does it experimentally test the direct 
implications of these suggestions on the public’s understanding of the visual, their risk 
perception, nor their potential behavioral response to a graphic.  What he does offer 
are a number of potential visual design techniques that forecasters could incorporate 
into a new design for the cone of uncertainty.  
 Combining these literatures, then, it follows that specific design techniques 
may help a visual and verbal model correspond more appropriately, subsequently 
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maximizing multimedia learning even further.  As Mayer explains, integration 
requires an individual to associate corresponding parts of both the visual and verbal 
message.  Perhaps for the cone of uncertainty, the visual and verbal message does not 
have adequate correspondence to maximize learning.  Instead, the divergence between 
the visual and verbal integration may influence the individual to focus solely on either 
type of message.  In fact, Drew & Grimes (1987) suggest that when a visual and 
verbal message does not have high correspondence, it forces the individual to focus 
more on one channel, in essence, creating a competition for attention between the 
visual and verbal message.  If the creator uses purposeful design, that is, if they 
visually frame their graphic to match their verbal objective, then it is conceivable that 
a person may integrate the information more accurately.  Visual framing is a technique 
to help increase the correspondence between a visual and verbal message whereby the 
creator purposefully designs the visual to match the verbal message.  
 To look at this potential phenomenon, three examples will be discussed.  
Example 1 will focus on when a visual does not match its message.  To do this, the 
NHC’s version of the cone of uncertainty will be used to show how the visual framing, 
the skinny black line, does not match one of the message objectives to emphasize the 
importance of the track uncertainty.  Example 2 will focus on when a visual does not 
match its behavioral action.  To show this, all the variations of the cone will be 
compared to the behavioral action at the 5-day cone at potential landfall, which is 
primarily to listen to emergency managers.  Lastly, example 3 will show a case where 
the visual is in agreement with one of the verbal messages.  This case will focus on the 
use of visual watches and warnings on graphics as compared to the message objective 
to explain the impacts and potential risks to an area.  This example will look at 
positive visual framing, but then suggest other potential variables that may cause 
misinterpretations. 
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Example 1 – What If the Visual Does Not Match Its Message Objective?  
Most of the behavioral actions from the cone of uncertainty discussed in this 
thesis stem from the cone at 5-days, 3-days, or 48 hours prior to landfall.  
Meteorologists identify the cone as an important design feature not only for 
communicating track uncertainty, but also to emphasize when to take action.  The last 
aspect of the 3-day cone that evokes action is the most controversial.  It is best 
described as the “skinny black line,” although it, too, undergoes design facelifts (See 
Image 4 and 8, for examples).  According to the meteorologists in this study, the 
“skinny black line” is often mistaken as the action indicator, instead of the cone.  One 
government forecaster explained: 
You have the problem that people will only react if they’re near the track itself.  
In fact, you saw this with Charley.  We had a very good forecast for Charley, 
as far as I’m concerned.  I mean, we had it moving right up the west coast of 
Florida, up towards Tampa, and then within 50 miles of landfall where it was 
actually predicted, it made a sudden turn to the right.  It made landfall 50 miles 
further south.  The people react you know.  ‘I’m following the track, following 
the line.’ 
As stated previously, the people of the Port Charlotte/Punta Gorda community did 
follow the line, not the cone, and this had its repercussions.  Further, another private 
sector forecaster described people’s reactions to the line stating, “They were watching 
the line and saw, ‘the lines going up there. We’re fine.’”  The message coming from 
the forecasters, though, is that if you are in the cone, you are not fine.  In other words, 
stop focusing on the line. 
As previously stated, meteorologists identify the cone as the action indicator, 
not the line.  Yet, the public, it appears, focuses more attention, or perhaps processing 
time, on the “skinny black line.”  Although this study cannot prove that the “skinny 
black line” is causing misinterpretations, it does suggest that it is, at the very least, one 
main concern.  Recall that the top two emphasized message objectives include 
scientific uncertainty and impacts, while the number one behavioral action message is 
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to listen to emergency managers.  The proposed problem is that the design of the 
“skinny black line” represents poor visual framing compared to its associated verbal 
message to focus on the white cone, the uncertainty of the track. 
Meteorologists in this study emphasize that the cone is of vital importance.  
The ‘skinny black line’ is present on the visual to show the most likely track of the 
center of the hurricane.  The relationship between the black line and the cone is that 
the black line could potentially move anywhere within that geographic boundaries of 
the cone.  There is not a stark difference between the two.  The line shows the most 
confident forecast, whereas the cone shows the uncertainty.  The area of concern is 
that for the NHC’s cone of uncertainty, they chose colors that show a stark difference, 
almost an opporsite relationship between one another.  According to Krygier & Wood 
(2005), choosing black for the line generates words such as mystery, strength, or 
heaviness.  Alternatively, for the white cone, the white color generates the words 
purity, clean, faith, and illness.  Thus, the ‘skinny black line’ indicates strength and 
heaviness compared to the white cone, which indicates purity and faith.  The public 
may focus on the black line due to the saturation of the color black compared to the 
white cone.  The white cone, representing uncertainty, appears less important using a 
“pure”, light color.   
Combining these color features with the message objective to focus on 
scientific uncertainty creates a conundrum.  It is possible that the colors will attract the 
viewer to focus on the ‘skinny black line,’ while listening to the broadcast 
meteorologist emphasize the scientific uncertainty of the storm path.  In this scenario, 
the person may experience confusion as they begin to integrate a visually, ‘strong and 
heavy’ black line with a verbal message to concentrate on uncertainty.  
Visual framing, in this example, is not saying that colors are not effective, but 
it is suggesting that the use of colors, or hues and saturations of colors, should more 
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accurately represent the message objective.  A potential example of visual framing is 
to emphasize the relationship between the cone and line by reducing the color contrast 
to shades of gray.  In doing so, it may create the connection necessary to relate the 
cone and line, while allowing the individual to relate the verbal uncertainty message to 
the graphic. 
 Alternatively, if the line is not the focus of the message objective, then simply 
take the line off the graphic.  Image 5 is an example of a variation of the cone of 
uncertainty without the line.   
 Visual framing in this example shows how a creator of a visual can 
purposefully design their graphic with their message objective in mind.  This study 
does not prove that these changes in visual framing lead to increased understanding or 
more accurate risk perception.  Nevertheless, it does offer potential ideas to link the 
visual design with the message objective with the hope to provide easier integration 
for the person processing the information.     
 
Example 2 – What If the Visual, Does Not Match Its Behavioral Message? 
 Although understanding the science and taking appropriate behavioral action 
are both important, ultimately, forecasters and emergency managers want individuals 
to focus on implementing actions that will protect their lives.  After all, the NWS’s 
mission is to “provide weather, hydrologic, and climate forecasts and warnings for the 
United States,… for the protection of life and property and the enhancement of the 
national economy” “(NOAAb, 2007)  Knowing this, the importance of understanding 
that the cone of uncertainty is the 66th percentile of the mean average track error over 
the last five years begins to dwindle.  As the previous example shows, it is not the 
exact size of the cone that matters, but how an individual reacts to the cone.   
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Even if both the message objectives as well as the behavioral actions are 
important, meteorologists still tend to emphasize the scientific side of their work more 
when designing visuals.  Looking at image 1, the cone of uncertainty as well as Image 
9, the newer NHC wind probability graphic, the first reaction is that it is a science tool 
to help decision makers, but not a tool to indicate what decisions to make.  The visual 
framing, the design of the graphic, suggests that the focus is on the message objectives 
of scientific uncertainty or potential impacts.  Despite the fact that there is a lot of text 
on the graphic, none of the text indicates what to do, who to call, and where to find 
out. 
Currently, the design of most hazard graphics occurs from a top down 
approach.  As noted earlier, meteorologists do not have unlimited time to have 
transactional communication with the public to gather their feedback.  Instead, most, if 
not all, graphics show the scientific perspective.  This perspective, however, does not 
match the verbal message to “get out of Dodge,” or to listen to your emergency 
managers.  An alternative design approach could visually frame the graphic from a 
bottom up perspective.   
This unconventional approach includes designing the graphic from the 
behavioral perspective.  Much of the cone of uncertainty may remain intact, but with a 
change in approach.  For example, one meteorologist explained, “If you were close 
enough to that track … then know you should expect damage within 50 miles of 
landfall.”  First, the track is referring to the contentious black line, but the forecaster 
provides one more characteristic.  If an individual is within 50 miles of either side of 
the black line, then that person should expect damage, and subsequently take some 
action.  Combining this with liability concerns, the ‘black line’ should first be drawn 
to scale to represent the 100 miles of expected damage, and second, the area covered 
by the ‘black line’ should represent the order to “listen to your emergency manager.”  
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The rest of the cone represents a forceful, yet slightly less powerful message of “Stay 
tuned to your emergency managers.”  Image 10 is a mock up of such a graphic.  
Though this graphic is far from perfect, it helps to incorporate the behavioral message 
while still showing the size and track of the cone.  As a forecaster stated, “People are 
going to take action.  It’s a perfectly human natural reaction to see that your area is in 
this cone … Being targeted by a hurricane you feel that you need to do something. 
There’s no doubt about it that that’s a perfectly natural thing.”  Indeed, it is, but when 
looking at the cone is it more important to understand what the cone means, or to 
prompt that individual to look up local official’s evacuation orders as their next step?  
Visual framing in this example shows how a creator of a visual can 
purposefully design their graphic with the behavioral action in mind.  Again, this 
example does not prove that these changes in visual framing lead to increased positive 
behavioral responses such as increased evacuation numbers.  Even so, it does offer 
potential ideas to link the visual design with the behavioral intent with the hope to 
provide easier integration for the person processing the information.    
 
Example 3 – What If the Visual Does Agree With the Verbal or Written 
Message? 
The first two examples of visual framing show how to redesign the graphic to 
more accurately express the message objective or behavioral action in a visual.  
Example 3 focuses on an aspect of the visual that does match the message objective.  
In other words, this visual and objective are already highly visually framed.  Visual 
framing is a potential tool to increase the proper integration of visual and verbal or 
written information.  It, however, is not the only variable or relationship of concern. 
Earlier in this thesis, it found that there is a link between two message 
objectives, the storm track and the impacts.  It showed that the uncertainty of the track 
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relates to the uncertainty of where the potential impacts are heading.  It also explained 
that the NHC in coordination with the NWS issues hurricane and tropical storm 
watches and warnings to alert people about these potential impacts.  These watches 
and warnings are quite visible on NHC’s cone of uncertainty.  The visible watches and 
warnings on the graphic correspond well with the verbal message to focus on impacts.  
This is an example of positive visual framing.   
Despite the positive visual framing from the meteorologist perspective, one 
question still emerges.  Does the public understand the link between the visual 
watches and warnings and their relation to verbal impacts?  The visual shows that 
there are clear warnings, and the message objective is stressing the impacts, then what 
is wrong? 
As stated previously, there is a variety of impacts related to each storm, and 
even further, every storm has varying levels of intensity.  The combination of this fact 
reveals what the public and forecasters alike already know: no two storms are alike.  
Yet, every storm has the same ‘warning’ associated with it.  Once a storm reaches 
hurricane strength and it potentially threatens U.S. land, the NHC in coordination with 
the NWS issue a hurricane warning.  It is possible that this visual use of color-coded 
warnings as well as its associated message, “it is a hurricane warning,” is not 
sufficient, and at least a few meteorologists agree.  One said, “The Weather Service 
has a very convoluted, complicated way of communicating watches and warnings and 
advisories. Extremely, extremely complicated.”  Another stated, “I hate the watch and 
warning too, they’re warped, but that’s another … .”  Further, one private sector 
meteorologist explained, “I’m not going to deal with the cone, the watches and 
warnings. I almost never show those.  Only if, if there’s something unique and 
interesting I can say about it other than just showing that watch warning graphic. I 
won’t even show it.”  It is apparent that there is disagreement as to the success of 
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communicating risks through watches and warnings suggesting that the message must 
include a more detailed description of this hurricane’s potential impacts.   Even 
further, this evidence suggests that not all design frames will highly correspond, 
despite the intent to match the visual and verbal message. 
Meteorologists would argue that extended detailed information exists through 
the NWS public advisories, private sector descriptions of impacts on their websites, or 
through additional impact graphics.  If the visual shows the warning, and the message 
is providing the additional information regarding impacts, then what is wrong with this 
Vx-Mx relationship?  Perhaps, it is the medium.  This study cannot clearly state 
whether this is a problem or not, but if the hypothesis holds that visual framing and 
message framing must correspond to one another, then the next variable of interest is 
the medium.  How easily accessible are the written descriptions?  What medium, i.e., 
newspaper, Internet, etc., are they printed in?  What percentage of the population has 
access to this medium?   
Further, if the Vx-Mx relationship is on TV, are they presented in a timely 
manner such that a person can process both messages simultaneously?  If the 
processing of one message, either visual or verbal, happens prior to the other, then 
how does this affect the person’s understanding?   Then again, does the presentation of 
the Vx-Mx relationship have to happen simultaneously to ensure ultimate 
understanding?  If not, is there a difference in understanding if one is presented before 
the other?  
This example shows how visual framing can appear to exist between the visual 
and verbal or written message, but as further analysis showed, not all visual frames 
correspond well with the message.  Again, this example does not prove that changes in 
visual framing of watches and warnings will lead to improved risk assessment.  Even 
more, this example proposes that visual framing may not always be the variable of 
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interest, showing that how these messages travel, through what medium, and when is 
also of interest.  
 
Summary 
This chapter provided examples of where the cone of uncertainty does not 
correspond to its message or behavioral intents.  As the literature states, to maximize 
learning it is best for the verbal messages to correspond with its visual.  The idea 
behind visual framing is that it forces the creator of a visual to purposefully design the 
graphic to match its verbal message.  The next chapter will discuss the implications of 





SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overview 
 As this thesis shows, the life of a visual is a complex process.  Chapter 4 
explored the creators of the cone of uncertainty showing how government and private 
sector institutions added to the designs of the graphic.  In addition, this chapter 
identified the types of communication that occurs within this visual communication 
process.  Chapter 5 began to explore the concept of visual validity assessing the cone 
of uncertainty’s ability to stand alone.  As this graphic is a visual communicating risk 
and complex science, this chapter suggests that the cone of uncertainty must have an 
associated explanation.  Chapter 6 reviewed the explanations and objectives for the 
cone of uncertainty.  It found that the top four objectives for the cone of uncertainty 
are the following: (1) scientific uncertainty, (2) risks (or impacts), (3) confidence, and 
(4) listening to emergency managers.  Chapter 7 examined the relationship between 
these objectives and the design of the visual.  In doing so, the concept of visual 
framing was developed.   
 The rest of this chapter will explore the implications of these findings, pose 
future research questions, and conclude with the overarching themes of this thesis. 
  
Types of Communication and Audience Analysis 
The analysis of the transmissions, transactions, and deficits of how 
communication functions in meteorology begins to shed light on a visual’s life, in 
particular, on a science visual’s life.  Although it would be easy to think of a visual as 
having a linear life juxtaposed between two worlds, those of the creator (the scientists) 
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and those of the reader (the levels of the audience), this case study shows that it is not 
that simple.  As Lewenstein (1995) has shown, science communication does not sit 
within a neat and simple framework, but rather it sits in a web of complex institutions, 
disciplines and mediums.  This complex web, then, entangles the life of a visual as it 
springs among the multiple nodes (See Figure 3 on page 58).   
The analysis of this case study introduced many nodes in which the cone of 
uncertainty must travel.  First, the interviewees from most institutions have stressed 
the need for a consistent message allowing the NHC to devise their official hurricane 
track forecast.  The NHC acts as an opinion leader setting the stage for the scientific 
part of the forecast and allowing others to disperse this message.  Second, the 
message, that is, the forecast, is distributed to their partners, and then the official NHC 
graphic is circulated to the public through the Internet or potentially other media 
outlets.  Government forecasters in this case identified two groups as their key 
partners, broadcast meteorologists and emergency managers.  This is where the life of 
a science visual begins to weave its intricate web. 
First, broadcast meteorologists take the official forecast and repackage it, 
sometimes tweaking the science, and always giving it a facelift.  The cone of 
uncertainty is the queen of design facelifts as companies like The Weather Channel, 
NBC, ABC, CBS, AccuWeather, or the WeatherBug place their own graphical touch 
to the original design.  In fact, companies like WSI, Inc, or Weather Central provide 
graphical software designed to allow each user to have their own unique look.  
Because the cone of uncertainty is a visual that receives a lot of media attention, it is 
influenced not only by scientific accuracy by the meteorologists but also by the 
pressures that go along with media marketing.  These pressures create variations of a 
cone (Images 5-8).  This variety in design raises a very important question.  If all 
institutions use the same forecast, but entirely different visual designs, then does this 
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change the consistency of the message?  In other words, can different visual designs 
change the scientific message associated with the visual? 
Although that question is beyond the scope of this particular case study, it 
raises concerns for the next partner, the emergency managers.  While the broadcast 
meteorologists are repackaging their visuals, the emergency managers are now 
receiving the forecast, and graphic, from the NHC.  Soon after, they could also be 
gathering the variations of the cone from private sector institutions.  This information 
gathering eventually leads to evacuation decisions, which are then distributed to the 
public.  The question is, how do these multiple images with multiple objectives change 
the emergency managers risk perspective, if at all? 
The public has now received visuals from a plethora of places from the NHC 
to ABC, from the Internet to the newspaper, and everywhere in between.  One more 
question must be raised.  To counter the question above, is visual variety of a 
consistent scientific message a negative part of this process?  Although this thesis does 
not focus on the public, literature shows that people respond differently to varying 
designs of visuals such as risk ladders (Lipskus & Hollands, 1999), attractiveness of 
colors (Garcia & Fry, 1986; Wells, Burnett & Moriarity, 2000), emotional response to 
and past experience with colors (Detenber, Simons, and Reiss, 2000; Kaya & Epps, 
2004), reactions to symbols (Tversky, Zacks, & Lee, 2000; Monmonier, 1993), and 
map projections (Mijksenaar, 1999), etc.  With this knowledge, citizens have the 
freedom to find a station or source that has a visual design, which may be more 
understandable for them. 
The process of mapping out the life of the cone of uncertainty showed the 
complex nature that visuals must travel through.  This case study identifies many 
characteristics for the cone, such as facelifts, multiple sources and several mediums.  
Are these characteristics systematic of all science visuals?  Do all science visuals 
 103
travel through such a complex web, or is there something unique about this case 
study?  The answer cannot be found in this study alone.  What this study has shown so 
far is that there are many nodes, or variables, that visuals may travel through during 
their existence.  This journey may subsequently affect the message, positively or 
negatively, once it arrives with the reader.  As Chapter 5 showed though, a risk visual 
rarely travels by itself but rather requires an explanation to achieve visual validity. 
 
Visual Validity in Relation to Message Objectives 
The concept of visual validity places weight on both the design of the visual as 
well as the verbal or written message associated with it.  As Chapter 5 indicated, the 
cone of uncertainty is not a visual that can stand alone but one that must have a written 
or verbal message to achieve high visual validity.  Recall that visual validity is an 
analytical construct to describe how accurately a reader’s meaning of a visual matches 
that of the creator’s intent.  Although this risk visual requires high visual validity, it 
remains unexplored as to what other types of risk visuals may also fall into this 
category.  The idea that risk visuals may require additional written or verbal 
description is potentially critical to ensuring that people understand the communicated 
risk message.  More risk visuals need assessment to determine if high visual validity is 
a feature of all risk visuals.   
If it is a feature of all risk visuals, as it is for the cone of uncertainty, then the 
life of these visuals just became more multifaceted.  As stated previously, visuals do 
not sit within a simple framework but rather function in a complex web of science 
communication.  Many research questions follow from this intricate web.  For 
example, imagine how visuals change their design through the institutional dimensions 
of this web.  Now, introduce the idea that there is a relationship between a visual and 
its associated written or verbal message.  Imagine how these visuals and their 
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associated written or verbal message change throughout the complex institutional 
dimensions.  How does institutional flexibility and constraints alter the visual design 
process?  The focus shifts from not only the effects on the visual in the complex web 
of science communication, but also between the visual and its associated verbal or 
written description (See Figure 4 on page 76).  Recall that Chapter 6 unveiled four 
main objectives for the cone of uncertainty: (1) scientific uncertainty, (2) risks (or 
impacts), (3) confidence, and (4) listening to emergency managers.  The question is 
how do these different objectives relate to the visual, and how does this affect visual 
validity, if at all?  What this does suggest, however, is that visual validity may be 
dependent upon the design of the visual as well as the objective attached to the visual. 
Further, depending on the medium, a visual and its associated message may 
not always travel in tandem.  TV, for example, strives for no silence, which would 
require talking while looking at a graphic.  The Internet, on the other hand, allows for 
more flexibility.  There could be a video clip with the graphic with audio, or 
alternatively, there could be a picture of the graphic alone or perhaps with a written 
message.  The variable of interest is now on the relationship between the visual and its 
associated message.  How do these two messages, visual and verbal, relate?  How does 
the placement or timing of these associated variables change the communicated 
outcome?  Are people more likely to process the visual or the verbal or written 
message objective if they do not travel in tandem?  How do the answers to all of these 
questions relate back to visual validity?  What are the requirements to ensure high 
visual validity for those graphics that require it?    
 
Exploring Relationships Between Visuals and Their Objectives 
The relationship between a visual and its message objectives plays an 
important role not only for the cone of uncertainty but also for other risks.  As 
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described earlier, hurricanes are a moving risk, which requires different behavioral 
actions at particular times.  Time is associated with the risk’s sense of urgency.  As the 
hurricane approaches landfall, the 5-day cone, the urgency increases, and even further 
increases in a 3-day cone.  Other risks have a sense of urgency as well.  Cancer 
diagnoses typically include what stage an individual is in indicating the level of 
urgency and its associated medical actions.  Even a child’s risk of failing a class has a 
number of signs such as, performing poorly on home works or in class exams, easily 
distracted in the classroom setting, or perhaps struggling with a personal issue such as 
a death in the family, or a separation of their parents.  Depending on which sign is 
present, and the urgency of the situation, the teacher and parents may decide to hire a 
tutor, see a counselor, or simply spend more time with the child.  All risks have stages 
of urgency that help determine which behavioral action an individual should take.  
Although not all of these examples have corresponding visuals, these examples do 
show the importance of associating the message, either visual or verbal, with its 
associated behavioral actions. 
 Knowing the relationship between a visual and its counterparts are critically 
important.  The life of a visual is not as simple as just designing it but may require 
systematic thought about what the message objective and behavioral message is and 
how this relates to the design of the visual.  Looking at Figure 5 on page 83, one can 
see how complex the relationships may become between a visual and its associated 
intents.  If a visual has too many verbal or written message objectives, then one visual 
may not be adequate in communicating all the ideas.  Indeed, many forecasters in this 
study alluded to the fact that many graphics exist, as they believe that one graphic 
cannot tell the entire story.  This may be true.  When communicating risks, however, it 
may also be important to emphasize or prioritize the order of communicating these 
objectives, as individuals at risk may not have long periods of time to listen to all the 
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information.  This point resonated with broadcast meteorologists who are under 
pressure to keep their forecasts under a specific time limit. 
 From a practical point of view then, before designing a risk visual, and even 
before communicating it, the creator should consider all possible message objectives.  
For the forecasters in this study, the objectives initially identified are scientific 
uncertainty, impacts, and confidence, and with further analysis behavioral 
components, such as listening to emergency managers, were also identified.  
Depending on the audience, different objectives may need emphasis over others.  
Since emergency managers are deciding when to issue mandatory evacuation orders, 
emphasizing the uncertainty and impacts may be more appropriate.  If the audience is 
the public, then forecasters may want to emphasize the behavioral component of the 
graphic.  Just as meteorologists suggest that one graphic does not tell the whole story, 
one objective does not adequately fit the whole audience.   
 After considering all the potential message objectives, the focus shifts to their 
relationship with the visual.  Can all four objectives from above fit the design of each 
variation of the cone of uncertainty?  Further, how do the different objectives when 
paired with the NHC cone of uncertainty, for example, change how people perceive 
their threat, their understanding of the science, or their potential behavioral actions?  Is 
it possible that different message frames paired with the same graphic changes how a 
person processes that information?    
 Even more, recall an earlier discussion on how broadcast meteorologists do 
explain their message objectives while showing the cone of uncertainty.  I stated, “If 
broadcasters are [explaining their message objective,] and if [the public] are listening 
to it, then one would surmise that the public would interpret the graphic correctly.  
Yet, as the literature has pointed out, there is some evidence to suggest that this is not 
the case.”  With Broad et al (2007) indicating public and media confusion regarding 
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the graphic, as well as anecdotal evidence from media coverage of Hurricane Charley, 
the evidence indicates that people may potentially be focusing on the graphic more 
than the potential message frames.  This raises a question concerning the relationship 
between a visual and its message frames.  If the focus is more on the visual than the 
message, then perhaps creators of visuals must design their graphic with a purpose in 
mind.  That is, creators must visually frame their graphics to correspond to their 
message objectives.  The next section will discuss the implications of visual framing. 
 
Visual Framing  
Although not conclusive from this data, visual framing is a viable concept that 
may help explain why multimedia messages become confusing providing the grounds 
for misinterpretation.  The cone of uncertainty is at least one example of how a visual 
has many potential relationships with its associated verbal or written messages.  It is 
easy to see how the integration of all of these relationships might create difficulty for 
an individual.  Visual framing is a worthy area of research that may offer insight into 
how multimedia messages can create effortless integration for the readers of such 
information.  For the field of risk communication, and especially for hazards such as 
hurricanes, visual framing may hold the key to effective multimedia communication 
with the hope that readers may successfully understand the science, perceive their 
individual risk, and take appropriate action.  In essence, if visual framing is an 
effective tool for communicating science, risk, and action, then visual framing 
facilitates the visual validity process.  That is, visual framing might be the tool that 
prompts individuals to take away one of the several valid responses, and even more 
importantly, not prompt the individual to respond inadequately.  
The difficulty with visual framing for science and risk visuals is that specific 
design techniques do not exist.  As this study shows though, knowing the objectives of 
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your message is the first step to visual framing.  The steps to follow need more 
research.  Although Tufte (1986) offers many rules for design techniques, his work 
does not tell us how people respond to those techniques.  What type of design helps 
the public understand science or make better risk assessments?  How do these 
techniques relate to the many message objectives that can exist?  Or, maybe 
developing techniques is too specific.  Perhaps, the designer of a visual knows best 
how to emphasize their message objectives into the design of the graphic.  As this 
study shows though, this is not the case for the cone of uncertainty.  Visual 
communication is still rich with research questions, especially as it relates to complex 
science and risk visuals.  
 
Visual Validity: How Does Scientific Intent Translate Through a Visual to Evoke 
Public Understanding of Science and Risk Assessment? 
 This thesis focused on one piece of the visual process, the forecaster’s 
perspective.  Although none of the data can prove exactly how scientific intent 
translates into understanding, there are a few points worth emphasizing as potential 
solutions.  First, in Chapter 4, the forecasters pointed out that transactional 
communication is a vital component in how they interact with emergency managers.  
This interaction may take place because of emergency manager’s increased 
responsibility during a hurricane, or alternatively, this interaction may occur because 
transactional communication is necessary for emergency managers to understand the 
visual.  Transactional communication may be necessary for people to become visually 
literate.   
Further, the use of transmission communication with the public might be one 
explanation for their confusion.  Trumbo (2006) suggests that the transmission view of 
science communication is detrimental to the visual learning process.  She states, 
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“Without some understanding of how visual representation functions, we are left out 
of an important part of discourse” (Trumbo, 2006, p. 278).  She argues that scientific 
discourse, or transactional communication, is a key component for one’s visual 
literacy ability. Transactional communication, then, may be one component to ensure 
high visual validity. 
Second, and building off of transactional communication, Chapter 5 showed 
how risk or complex science visuals may need a written or verbal explanation to 
ensure high visual validity.  The symbols used, and the science represented may be too 
complex.  Providing supplementary explanation may be another component to 
achieving high visual validity.  
Further, providing explanation and transactional communication may occur in 
tandem or separately.  Having both components may increase the possibility of 
achieving visual validity.  An individual can read an explanation, but also ask 
questions if something is still unclear.  It is possible though, that only one component 
is necessary for an individual to achieve a fuller understanding of the visual.  
The question remaining is what if transactional communication and an 
explanation still does not attain an accurate understanding or risk assessment?  Is there 
another component to achieving high visual validity?  Does an individual need a 
higher education or analytical ability to understand such graphics?  My future research 
will continue to explore the answers to these questions. 
 
Future Research  
 This thesis outlined many research questions.  First, to explore the concept of 
visual validity further, I need to see this case study through by asking the following 
two questions: (1)  how does the public interpret the cone of uncertainty, and (2) how 
does the public’s interpretation of the graphic match that of the scientific intent 
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outlined in this thesis?  If the public’s interpretation does not match the scientific 
intent, then this may provide further questioning for the concept of visual framing.  
Does visual framing increase the visual validity process?   
 Further, it is important to not only understand the public’s interpretation but 
also try to understand what behavioral action they took based on that interpretation.  It 
is possible that individuals may take away a wrong interpretation, but perhaps through 
other social influences (family members, neighbors, faith-based organization, etc.) 
they still made a positive behavioral choice.  The question here is what role, if any, the 
visual played in this process. 
As stated earlier, visual framing also needs further research.  From a design 
perspective, how does one visually frame an image?  Can guidelines be developed for 
science and risk visual framing?  Alternatively, does each case study need specific 
analysis to determine how verbal or written objectives visually correspond to the 
visual? 
Further, another question worthy of future research focuses on the variety of 
graphics that exist on the same topic.  The interviewees in this study emphasized the 
important of consistent messages when it comes to hazards.  This raises the question 
whether different visuals make a consistent forecast seem inconsistent.  If forecasters 
use the same science, but represent it differently, then how does this affect public 
understanding of science and their risk assessments? 
These questions only begin to scratch the surface of future research in this 







This thesis started with an applied problem: The public and emergency 
managers were misinterpreting the cone of uncertainty, an important hurricane 
communication tool.  At the time, I simply wanted to know why and how to fix it.  
What grew out of this case study over the last two years was a deeper conceptual 
question regarding visual validity: How do complex science and risk messages 
translate through visuals to evoke public understanding of science and risk 
assessment?  This question has been the impetus for this thesis and will be the 
motivation for many research questions in the future. 
This thesis begins to make a mark on the visual communication literature.  I 
feel, though, that its reach goes beyond just visual communication.  Recently, a 
colleague asked me why I needed to develop visual validity.  “What makes visual 
validity different from verisimilitude,” she asked.  Verisimilitude, according to the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary (2008), is the quality or state of accurately representing 
something.  How does one accurately represent complex science or risk?  The 
difficulty with this area is that no photograph, image, graphic, or map will ever 
accurately capture scientific uncertainty or risk from a “truth” point of view.  The 
mere fact that scientific uncertainty is uncertain makes it difficult to capture the truth.  
For complex science and risk visuals, it is not necessarily about capturing the truth but 
about being objective and in that process ensuring that readers of that objective visual 
understand the scientific or risk intent, especially where consequences of 
misinterpretation may be involved.   
This thesis and the idea of visual validity not only add to the visual 
communication literature but also expand its reach to the risk and science 
communication area.  The intersection of visuals, science, and risk is a rich area full of 
research questions, as this case study has shown.  It is my hope that the questions that 
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emerged out of this thesis will not only add to the visual, risk, and science 
communication literature but also improve the visuals used for complex science and 
risk to ensure that the public will understand these messages and be prepared for the 
risks of the future.  
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APPENDIX A 
HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL INFORMATION 
CONSENT FORM 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Visual Perception and Its Influence on Decision-making 
You are invited to participate in a research study on risk perceptions associated with 
visual graphics, specifically the cone of uncertainty.  You were selected as a possible 
participant because of your expertise in this field. I ask that you read this form and ask 
any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study. 
 
Background Information: This research will interview hurricane forecasters and 
national hurricane experts to understand the objectives of the cone of uncertainty.   
 
Procedures: If you agree to be in this study, I will ask you to participate in an 
interview, envisioned to last between 30 minutes to one hour. During this interview, I 
will ask what you think the objectives are for the cone of uncertainty, the scientific 
uncertainty behind the graphic as well as your opinion on public perception of the 
graphic. 
 
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: I do not anticipate any risks for you 
participating in this study, other than those encountered in day-to-day life. If we 
correspond via email, there is a chance that a third-party could read our 
correspondence. Indirect benefits of participation include a greater understanding of 
how visuals affect risk perception as well as specifically understanding how the public 
interprets the cone of uncertainty.  
 
Voluntary Nature of Participation: Your decision whether or not to participate will 
not affect your current or future relations with Cornell University. Your participation 
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is voluntary, and you may refuse to participate before the interview begins, withdraw 
or ask questions at any time, and/or skip any questions with no effect. 
 
Confidentiality: The records of this study will be kept private.  In light of your 
potentially publicly visible position, you have the option to remain confidential or not.  
If you decide to remain confidential, in any sort of report I might publish, I will not 
include any information that will make it possible to identify you. All data will be 
securely stored in my office on my computer, several hard disks, and audiotapes. Hard 
copies of data will remain in my office. All data will be destroyed (i.e., shredded or 
erased) when their use is no longer needed but not before a minimum of five years 
after data collection. 
 
If you choose not to be confidential, articles for publishing may include your 
comments that will make it possible to identify you.   
 
I choose to be confidential in this study (circle one):     Yes      or      No  
 
Permission to Use Recording Device: Please sign below if you are willing to have 
this interview audio-taped. You may still participate in this study if you are not willing 
to have the interview recorded. 
 
Signature ___________________________________ Date 
________________________ 
 
Contacts and Questions: The researcher conducting this study is: 
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Gina M. Eosco, Department of Communication, 336 Kennedy Hall, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, New York 14853. Phone: 781-704-4458; Fax: 607-254-1322; 
Email: gme7@cornell.edu 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, 
you may contact the University Committee on Human Subjects (UCHS) at 607-255-
5138, or access their website at 
http://www.osp.cornell.edu/Compliance/UCHS/homepageUCHS.htm. 
 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information and have received answers 
to any questions I asked. I consent to participate in the study. 
 
Signature ___________________________________ Date 
________________________ 
 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the 
end of the study and was approved by the UCHS on February 2, 2007. 
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Interview Guide for Hurricane Forecasters 
 
History of Cone 
1.) I was wondering if you could tell me about the history of the cone of 
uncertainty during your tenure at the NHC.  
a. Why did they shift to a new cone in 2002? (show example if needed) 
b. What was ineffective about the graphic prior to 2002? (show example if 
needed) 
c. What do you think improved from the first graphic to the second 
graphic?  
d. Do you recall how the public perceived the first graphic?  
   
Science of Cone 
1.) When designing the new cone of uncertainty for the 2002 season, what 
scientific aspects played a role in the design?  
2.) What aspects of the science are most critical to communicate? Why?  
3.) How does each hurricane’s “cone” vary?  
a. Hopefully he will say something about uncertainty of models, models 
not converging, etc 




Objective of the Cone and Public (mis)perceptions (his views, his stories, his 
suggestions) 
1.) In designing the 2002 cone, how did you envision the public’s perception of 
their risk?  
2.) Who came up with the new design? Did they test public perception? 
3.) What part of the graphic do people find the most confusing?  
a. Can you share some stories of people misunderstanding? 
b. Can you share some storied of people understanding?  
4.) In designing the graphic, what decisions do you feel people can make from this 
graphic?  
a. Hopefully he will say evacuations 
b. Follow up – something about large geographic area/not everyone will 
make the same decisions 





































Image 2. Hurricane Katrina, Advisory #25 (http://hurricane.lsu.edu/floodprediction/katrina25/) 
(http://hurricane.lsu.edu/floodprediction/) 





























Image 3.  The cone  of uncertainty graphic for Hurricane Charley.  Both Tampa and Port Charlotte are in the 
white area of the cone of uncertainty.’  This means that both communities have the potential for a direct hit from 











































































































Image 9. National Hurricane Center graphic showing probabilities of tropical storm force winds for Tropical 

















 Image 10.  A mock cone of uncertainty to show how the graphic can potentially show the behavioral actions 
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